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Contracts and externalities: How things fall apart

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Author Info
Genicot, Garance
Ray, Debraj

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 131 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (November)
Pages: 71-100
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:131:y:2006:i:1:p:71-100

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  1. Gale, Douglas, 1995. "Dynamic Coordination Games," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 1-18, January.
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  2. Ilya R. Segal & Michael D. Whinston, 2000. "Naked Exclusion: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 296-309, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Shleifer, Andrei, 1986. "Implementation Cycles," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(6), pages 1163-90, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Aghion, Philippe & Bolton, Patrick, 1987. "Contracts as a Barrier to Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 388-401, June.
  5. Jay Pil Choi, 1994. "Irreversible Choice of Uncertain Technologies with Network Externalities," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(3), pages 382-401, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Genicot, Garance, 2002. "Bonded labor and serfdom: a paradox of voluntary choice," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 101-127, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Ilya Segal, 1999. "Contracting With Externalities," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(2), pages 337-388, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Rasmusen, Eric B & Ramseyer, J Mark & Wiley, John S, Jr, 1991. "Naked Exclusion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1137-45, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Diamond, Peter A, 1982. "Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(5), pages 881-94, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Murphy, Kevin M & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1989. "Industrialization and the Big Push," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(5), pages 1003-26, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Basu, Kaushik, 1986. "One Kind of Power," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(2), pages 259-82, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Kamien, Morton I. & Oren, Shmuel S. & Tauman, Yair, 1992. "Optimal licensing of cost-reducing innovation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(5), pages 483-508. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1007-28, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Kranton, Rachel E, 1996. "Reciprocal Exchange: A Self-Sustaining System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 830-51, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Katz, Michael L & Shapiro, Carl, 1986. "How to License Intangible Property," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(3), pages 567-89, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Adsera, Alicia & Ray, Debraj, 1998. " History and Coordination Failure," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 267-76, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Makowski, Louis, 1980. "Perfect competition, the profit criterion, and the organization of economic activity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 222-242, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1998. "Exclusive Dealing," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(1), pages 64-103, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  19. Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro & Wright, Randall, 1989. "On Money as a Medium of Exchange," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(4), pages 927-54, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Innes, Robert & Sexton, Richard J, 1994. "Strategic Buyers and Exclusionary Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 566-84, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Matsuyama, Kiminori, 1991. "Increasing Returns, Industrialization, and Indeterminacy of Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 106(2), pages 617-50, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  22. Cooper, Russell & John, Andrew, 1988. "Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(3), pages 441-63, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Krugman, Paul, 1991. "History versus Expectations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 106(2), pages 651-67, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  24. Katz, Michael L & Shapiro, Carl, 1986. "Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 822-41, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  25. Hart, Oliver, 1982. "A Model of Imperfect Competition with Keynesian Features," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 97(1), pages 109-38, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  26. Acemoglu, Daron & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 1997. "Was Prometheus Unbound by Chance? Risk, Diversification, and Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(4), pages 709-51, August.
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  27. Katz, Michael L & Shapiro, Carl, 1992. "Product Introduction with Network Externalities," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(1), pages 55-83, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Pierre Dupraz & Karine Latouche & Nadine Turpin, 2007. "Programmes agri-environnementaux en présence d’effets de seuil," Cahiers d'Economie et Sociologie Rurales, INRA Department of Economics, vol. 82, pages 5-32. [Downloadable!]
  2. Francis Bloch & Armando Gomes, 2004. "Contracting with Externalities and Outside Options," Working Papers 2004.78, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Mike Felgenhauer & Hans Grüner, 2007. "Distortionary lobbying," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 181-195, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Sergio Currarini & Francesco Feri, 2006. "Delegation Versus Centralization: The Role of Externalities," Working Papers 2006_15, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Paul Belleflamme & Eric Toulemonde, 2007. "Negative Intra-Group Externalities in Two-Sided Markets," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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