The Survival of the Conformist: Social Pressure and Renewable Resource Management
AbstractThis paper examines the role of pro-social behavior as a mechanism for the establishment and maintenance of cooperation in resource use under variable social and environmental conditions. By coupling resource stock dynamics with social dynamics concerning compliance to a social norm prescribing non-excessive resource extraction in a common pool resource (CPR), we show that when reputational considerations matter and a sufficient level of social stigma affects the violators of a norm, sustainable outcomes are achieved. We find large parameter regions where norm-observing and norm-violating types coexist, and analyze to what extent such coexistence depends on the environment.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2010.127.
Date of creation: Oct 2010
Date of revision:
Cooperation; Social Norm; Ostracism; Common Pool Resource; Evolutionary Game Theory; Replicator Equation; Agent-based Simulation; Coupled Socio-resource Dynamics;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-11-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2010-11-06 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2010-11-06 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2010-11-06 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2010-11-06 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2010-11-06 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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- Andries Richter & Johan Grasman, 2013. "The Transmission of Sustainable Harvesting Norms When Agents Are Conditionally Cooperative," Working Papers 2013.80, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
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