Spatial Evolution of Social Norms in a Common-Pool Resource Game
AbstractWe study the conditions for the emergence of cooperation in a spatial common-pool resource (CPR) game. We consider three types of agents: cooperators, defectors and enforcers. The role of enforcers is to punish defectors for overharvesting the resource. Agents are located on a circle and they only observe the actions of their two nearest neighbors. Their payoffs are determined by both local and global interactions and they modify their actions by imitating the strategy in their neighborhood with the highest average payoffs on average. Using theoretical and numerical analysis, we find a large diversity of equilibria to be the outcome of the game. In particular, we find conditions for the occurrence of equilibria in which the three strategies coexist. We also derive the stability of these equilibria. Finally, we show that introducing resource dynamics in the system favors the occurrence of cooperative equilibria. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2007
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists in its journal Environmental and Resource Economics.
Volume (Year): 36 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100263
common property; cooperation; evolutionary game theory; local and global interaction game; self-organization; C72; Q2;
Other versions of this item:
- Noailly, J. & Withagen, C.A.A.M. & Bergh, J.C.J.M. van den, 2007. "Spatial evolution of social norms in a common-pool resource game," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-192946, Tilburg University.
- Joëlle Noailly & Cees A. Withagen & Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh, 2005. "Spatial Evolution of Social Norms in a Common-Pool Resource Game," Working Papers 2005.79, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation
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