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Spatial Evolution of Social Norms in a Common-Pool Resource Game

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Author Info
Joëlle Noailly (CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis)
Cees A. Withagen (Free University and Tilburg University)
Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh (Free University)

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Abstract

We study the conditions for the emergence of cooperation in a spatial common-pool resource game. We consider three types of agents: cooperators, defectors and enforcers. The role of enforcers is to punish defectors for overharvesting the resource. Agents are located around a circle and they only observe the actions of their two nearest neighbors. Their payoffs are determined by both local and global interactions and they modify their actions by imitating the strategy in their neighborhood with the highest payoffs on average. Using theoretical and numerical analysis, we find that a large diversity of equilibria exists in this game. In particular, we derive conditions for the occurrence of equilibria in which the three strategies coexist. We also discuss the stability of these equilibria. Finally, we show that introducing resource dynamics favors the occurrence of cooperative equilibria.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2005.79.

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Date of creation: May 2005
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Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2005.79

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Related research
Keywords: Common property; Evolutionary game theory; Local interactions game; Self-organization; Cooperation;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Sethi, Rajiv & Somanathan, E, 1996. "The Evolution of Social Norms in Common Property Resource Use," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 766-88, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Jean-Philippe Atzenhoffer, 2008. "Evolutionary Stability in Common Pool Resources," Working Papers of BETA 2008-21, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, ULP, Strasbourg. [Downloadable!]
  2. Joëlle Noailly & Jeroen Bergh & Cees Withagen, 2009. "Local and Global Interactions in an Evolutionary Resource Game," Computational Economics, Springer, vol. 33(2), pages 155-173, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Jeroen Bergh, 2007. "Evolutionary thinking in environmental economics," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 17(5), pages 521-549, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Jurjen Kamphorst & Gerard van der Laan, 2006. "Learning in a Local Interaction Hawk-Dove Game," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-034/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-6.

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