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A Note on Imitation-Based Competition in Common-Pool Resources

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  • Jean-Philippe Atzenhoffer

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  • Jean-Philippe Atzenhoffer, 2010. "A Note on Imitation-Based Competition in Common-Pool Resources," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 47(2), pages 299-304, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:47:y:2010:i:2:p:299-304
    DOI: 10.1007/s10640-010-9372-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Apesteguia, Jose & Huck, Steffen & Oechssler, Jorg, 2007. "Imitation--theory and experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 217-235, September.
    2. Ito, Masaru & Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Une, Masashi, 1995. "The Tragedy of the Commons revisited Identifying behavioral principles," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 311-335, December.
    3. Fernando Vega-Redondo, 1997. "The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(2), pages 375-384, March.
    4. Walker, James M & Gardner, Roy, 1992. "Probabilistic Destruction of Common-Pool Resources: Experimental Evidence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 102(414), pages 1149-1161, September.
    5. Joëlle Noailly & Cees Withagen & Jeroen Bergh, 2007. "Spatial Evolution of Social Norms in a Common-Pool Resource Game," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 36(1), pages 113-141, January.
    6. Oses-Eraso, Nuria & Viladrich-Grau, Montserrat, 2007. "On the sustainability of common property resources," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 393-410, May.
    7. Walker, James M. & Gardner, Roy & Ostrom, Elinor, 1990. "Rent dissipation in a limited-access common-pool resource: Experimental evidence," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 203-211, November.
    8. Sethi, Rajiv & Somanathan, E, 1996. "The Evolution of Social Norms in Common Property Resource Use," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 766-788, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Konrad, Kai A. & Morath, Florian, 2016. "Bargaining with incomplete information: Evolutionary stability in finite populations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 118-131.
    2. Torben Klarl, 2013. "Market dynamics, dynamic resource management and environmental policy in the context of (strong) sustainability," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 23(4), pages 861-888, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Common resources; Imitation behavior; Evolutionary stable strategy; Evolutionary games; C73; D41; Q20;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D41 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Perfect Competition
    • Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General

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