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Submodularity and the evolution of Walrasian behavior

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  • Burkhard C. Schipper

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Abstract

Vega-Redondo (1997) showed that imitation leads to the Walrasian outcome in Cournot Oligopoly. We generalize his result to aggregative quasi-submodular games. Examples are the Cournot Oligopoly, Bertrand games with differentiated complementary products, Common- Pool Resource games, Rent-Seeking games and generalized Nash-Demand games.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Games Theory.

Volume (Year): 32 (2004)
Issue (Month): 4 (08)
Pages: 471-477

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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:32:y:2004:i:4:p:471-477

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Related research

Keywords: C72; D21; D43; L13; Imitation; aggregate-taking strategy; price-taking behavior; lattice theory; stochastic stability;

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References

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  1. Walker, James M. & Gardner, Roy & Ostrom, Elinor, 1990. "Rent dissipation in a limited-access common-pool resource: Experimental evidence," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 203-211, November.
  2. M. Kandori & G. Mailath & R. Rob, 1999. "Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 500, David K. Levine.
  3. Fernando Vega-Redondo, 1997. "The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(2), pages 375-384, March.
  4. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
  5. Xavier Vives, 2001. "Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 026272040x, December.
  6. Burkhard Hehenkamp & Wolfgang Leininger & Alex Possajennikov, 2001. "Evolutionary Rent-Seeking," CESifo Working Paper Series 620, CESifo Group Munich.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Peter Duersch & Joerg Oechssler & Burkhard C. Schipper, 2011. "Unbeatable Imitation," Working Papers 103, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  2. Burkhard C. Schipper, 2005. "The Evolutionary Stability of Optimism, Pessimism and Complete Ignorance," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse35_2005, University of Bonn, Germany.
  3. Burkhard C. Schipper, 2005. "Imitators and Optimizers in Cournot oligopoly," Working Papers 537, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  4. Peter Duersch & Albert Kolb & Jörg Oechssler & Burkhard Schipper, 2010. "Rage against the machines: how subjects play against learning algorithms," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 43(3), pages 407-430, June.
  5. Birgitte Sloth & Hans Jørgen Whitta-Jacobsen, 2006. "Economic Darwinism," CIE Discussion Papers 2006-01, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
  6. Acemoglu, Daron & Jensen, Martin Kaae, 2009. "Aggregate Comparative Statics," CEPR Discussion Papers 7254, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Pascal Billand & Christophe Bravard, 2006. "Les modèles de comportements adaptatifs appliqués à l'oligopole de Cournot," Post-Print ujm-00121658, HAL.
  8. Peter Duersch & Joerg Oechssler & Burkhard Schipper, 2011. "Once Beaten, Never Again: Imitation in Two-Player Potential Games," Working Papers 1112, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  9. Jacques Durieu & Hans Haller & Philippe Solal, 2004. "Nonspecific Networking," Game Theory and Information 0403005, EconWPA.
  10. Antonio J. Morales & Gonzalo Fernández-de-Córdoba, 2010. "The Walrasian Output Beats the Market," Working Papers 2010-08, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
  11. Jacques Durieu & Hans Haller & Philippe Solal, 2011. "Nonspecific Networking," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 2(1), pages 87-113, February.
  12. Durieu, Jacques & Haller, Hans & Solal, Philippe, 2005. "Interaction on Hypergraphs," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 05-34, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.

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