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- An Evolutionary Model Of Bertrand Oligopoly Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Ana B. Ania (Universidad de Alicante)
Carlos Alós-Ferrer (Universidad de Alicante)
Klaus R. Schenk-Hoppé (University of Bielefeld)
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We analyze the long-run outcome of markets in which boundedly rational firms with a decreasingreturns to scale technology compete in prices. The behavior of these firms is based on limitation ofsuccess and experimentation. In this framework, we introduce a new approach to model boundedlyrational behavior, based on the idea of behavioral principles, i.e. formal descriptions. Even with thesimplest ones, the result is that the prices announced are a strict refinement of the set of Nashequilibria. With more sophisticated behavioral principles, the long-run outcome corresponds to theconcept of central prices (wich are also Nash equilibria) introduced here. This is a robust andclear-cut prediction wich, under quadratic costs and arbitrary demand, essentially coincides with theWalrasian equilibrium.
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Paper provided by Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) in its series Working Papers. Serie AD with number
1998-14.
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Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: Jul 1998Date of revision:
Publication status: Published by IvieHandle: RePEc:ivi:wpasad:1998-14Contact details of provider: Postal: C/ Guardia Civil, 22, Esc 2a, 1o, E-46020 VALENCIA Phone: +34 96 319 00 50 Fax: +34 96 319 00 55 Email: Web page: http://www.ivie.es/ More information through EDIRC
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Keywords: evolution ; mutation ; imitation ; Other versions of this item:
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Carlos Alos-Ferrer & Ana B. Ania & Fernando Vega-Redondo, 1998.
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Dastidar, Krishnendu Ghosh, 1995.
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Other versions: Bjornerstedt, J. & Weibull, J.W., 1993.
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DELTA Working Papers
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Schlag, Karl H., 1998.
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Karl H. Schlag, 1995.
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[Downloadable!] Young, H Peyton, 1993.
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Econometrica ,
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Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Ana B. Ania, 2000.
"Learning by Imitation when Playing the Field ,"
Vienna Economics Papers
0005, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
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Elvio Accinelli & Juan Gabriel Brida & Edgar Carrera & Lionello Punzo, 2006.
"Dinámica evolutiva en un modelo de interacción entre visitantes y residentes de una localidad turística ,"
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1606, Department of Economics - dECON.
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Edward Cartwright, 2004.
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2004.85, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
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Other versions: J. Thijssen, 2005.
"Nearly-complete Decomposability and Stochastic Stability with an Application to Cournot Oligopoly ,"
Trinity Economics Papers
tep6, Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics.
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Pascal Billand & Christophe Bravard, 2006.
"Les modèles de comportements adaptatifs appliqués à l'oligopole de Cournot ,"
Post-Print
ujm-00121658_v1, HAL.
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Klaus Reiner Schenk-Hoppé, .
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iewwp067, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW.
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Edward Cartwright, 2007.
"Imitation, coordination and the emergence of Nash equilibrium ,"
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Carlos Alós-Ferrer, 2001.
"Cournot versus Walras in Dynamic Oligopolies with Memory ,"
Vienna Economics Papers
0110, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
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Other versions: Carlos Alós-Ferrer, 2000.
"Finite Population Dynamics and Mixed Equilibria ,"
Vienna Economics Papers
0008, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
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repec:tcd:wpaper:tep6 is not listed on IDEAS
Jordi Brandts & Klaus Abbink, 2004.
"24 ,"
Levine's Bibliography
122247000000000073, UCLA Department of Economics.
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Cartwright, Edward, 2003.
"Imitation and the Emergence of Nash Equilibrium Play in Games with Many Players ,"
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)
684, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
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