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Imitation and the Emergence of Nash Equilibrium Play in Games with Many Players

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  • Cartwright, Edward

    (Department of Economics, EUREQua)

Abstract

We model a learning dynamic in which players imitate and innovate. Of interest is to question whether Nash equilibrium play emerges, and if so, the role that imitation plays in this emergence. Our main result provides a general class of coordination games for which approximate Nash equilibrium play does emerge. Important conditions include that players imitate "similar" individuals. The role of imitation in learning is discussed in the context of two examples where it is shown that imitation can lead to pareto superio outcomes.

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File URL: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/2008/twerp684.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Warwick, Department of Economics in its series The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) with number 684.

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Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:684

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Keywords: imitation ; best reply ; convergence ; Nash equilibrium;

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  9. Myrna Wooders & Edward Cartwright & Reinhard Selten, 2003. "Social Conformity in Games with Many Players," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 2003.121, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
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  18. Schlag, Karl H., 1996. "Which one should I imitate?," Discussion Paper Serie B, University of Bonn, Germany 365, University of Bonn, Germany.
  19. Kirman, Alan, 1993. "Ants, Rationality, and Recruitment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 108(1), pages 137-56, February.
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  22. Ana B. Ania & Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Klaus R. Schenk-Hoppé, 1998. "- An Evolutionary Model Of Bertrand Oligopoly," Working Papers. Serie AD, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) 1998-14, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  23. David K Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2000. "Evolution Through Imitation in a Single Population," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2122, David K. Levine.
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