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Nonspecific Networking

Author

Listed:
  • Jacques Durieu

    (University of Saint-Etienne, CNRS UMR 5824 GATE Saint-Etienne-Lyon, 42023 Saint- Etienne, France)

  • Hans Haller

    (Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA 24061, USA)

  • Philippe Solal

    (University of Saint-Etienne, CNRS UMR 5824 GATE Saint-Etienne-Lyon, 42023 Saint- Etienne, France)

Abstract

A new model of strategic networking is developed and analyzed, where an agent’s investment in links is nonspecific. The model comprises a large class of games which are both potential and super- or submodular games. We obtain comparative statics results for Nash equilibria with respect to investment costs for supermodular as well as submodular networking games. We also study supermodular games with potentials. We find that the set of potential maximizers forms a sublattice of the lattice of Nash equilibria and derive comparative statics results for the smallest and the largest potential maximizer. Finally, we provide a broad spectrum of applications from social interaction to industrial organization.

Suggested Citation

  • Jacques Durieu & Hans Haller & Philippe Solal, 2011. "Nonspecific Networking," Games, MDPI, vol. 2(1), pages 1-27, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:2:y:2011:i:1:p:87-113:d:11358
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    Cited by:

    1. Bloch, Francis & Dutta, Bhaskar, 2009. "Communication networks with endogenous link strength," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 39-56, May.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    social networks; local interaction games; nonspecific networking;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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