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The cutting power of preparation

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  • Tercieux, Olivier

    (Dept. of Econometrics and OR, Tilburg University, The Netherlands)

  • Voorneveld, Mark

    ()
    (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics)

Abstract

In a strategic game, a curb set [Basu and Weibull, Econ. Letters 36 (1991) 141] is a product set of pure strategies containing all best responses ro every possible belief restricted to this set. Prep sets [Voorneveld, Games Econ. Behav. 48 (2004) 403] relax this condition by only requiring the presence of at least one best response to such a belief. The purpose of this paper is to provide economically interesting classes of games in which minimal prep sets give sharp predictions, whereas in relevant subclasses of these games, minimal curb sets have no cutting power whatsoever and simply consist of the entire strategy space. These classes include potential games, congestion games with player-specific payoffs, and supermodular games.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Stockholm School of Economics in its series Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance with number 583.

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Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 31 Jan 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:hastef:0583

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Keywords: curb sets; prep sets; potential games; congestion games; supermodular games;

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References

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  1. Voorneveld, M. & Kets, W. & Norde, H.W., 2005. "An Axiomatization of Minimal Curb Sets," Discussion Paper 2005-53, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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  25. Zhou Lin, 1994. "The Set of Nash Equilibria of a Supermodular Game Is a Complete Lattice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 295-300, September.
  26. Kets, Willemien & Voorneveld, Mark, 2005. "Learning to be prepared," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 590, Stockholm School of Economics.
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Cited by:
  1. Kets, W. & Voorneveld, M., 2005. "Learning to be Prepared," Discussion Paper 2005-117, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  2. Willemien Kets, 2007. "The minority game: An economics perspective," Papers 0706.4432, arXiv.org.
  3. Kets, W. & Voorneveld, M., 2007. "Congestion, Equilibrium and Learning: The Minority Game," Discussion Paper 2007-61, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.

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