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Interaction on Hypergraphs

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Author Info
Durieu, Jacques (CREUSET, University of Saint-Etienne)
Haller, Hans () (Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University)
Solal, Philippe (CREUSET, University of Saint-Etienne)
Abstract

Interaction on hypergraphs generalizes interaction on graphs, also known as pairwise local interaction. For games played on a hypergraph which are supermodular potential games, logit-perturbed best-response dynamics are studied. We find that the associated stochastically stable states form a sublattice of the lattice of Nash equilibria and derive comparative statics results for the smallest and the largest stochastically stable state. In the special case of networking games, we obtain comparative statics results with respect to investment costs, for Nash equilibria of supermodular games as well as for Nash equilibria of submodular games.

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Paper provided by Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim in its series Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications with number 05-34.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 22 Oct 2005
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Handle: RePEc:xrs:sfbmaa:05-34

Note: Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 504, at the University of Mannheim, is gratefully acknowledged. This paper was written while Hans Haller was visiting the SFB 504, University of Mannheim.
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