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Equilibrium Selection in Games with Macroeconomic Complementarities

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Author Info

  • Kaarboe, O.M.
  • Tieman, A.F.

Abstract

We apply the stochastic evolutionary approach of equilibrium selection to macroeconomic models in which a complementarity at the macro level is present. These models often exhibit multile Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria , and the best response-correspondence of an individual increases with a measure of the aggregate state of the economy.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Bergen in its series Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen with number 2199.

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Length: 42 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:bereco:2199

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, University of Bergen Fosswinckels Gate 6. N-5007 Bergen, Norway
Phone: (+47)55589200
Fax: (+47)55589210
Email:
Web page: http://www.uib.no/econ/
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Keywords: GAME THEORY ; MACROECONOMICS ; MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS;

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References

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  1. Weibull, Jörgen W. & van Damme, Eric, 1998. "Evolution with Mutations Driven by Control Costs," Working Paper Series 501, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  2. Hart, Oliver, 1982. "A Model of Imperfect Competition with Keynesian Features," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 97(1), pages 109-38, February.
  3. Kandori Michihiro & Rob Rafael, 1995. "Evolution of Equilibria in the Long Run: A General Theory and Applications," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 383-414, April.
  4. Droste, E.J.R. & Tuinstra, J., 1998. "Evolutionary Selection of Behavioral Rules in a Cournot Model: A Local Bifurcation Analysis," Discussion Paper 1998-86, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  5. Conlisk, John, 1980. "Costly optimizers versus cheap imitators," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 275-293, September.
  6. Vives, X., 1988. "Nash Equilibrium With Strategic Complementarities," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 107-88, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  7. Kandori, M. & Mailath, G.J., 1991. "Learning, Mutation, And Long Run Equilibria In Games," Papers 71, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - John M. Olin Program.
  8. Droste, E. & Hommes, C.H. & Tuinstra, J., 1999. "Endogenous Fluctuations under Evolutionary Pressure in Cournot Competition," CeNDEF Working Papers 99-04, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance.
  9. Diamond, Peter A, 1982. "Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(5), pages 881-94, October.
  10. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
  11. Cooper, Russell & Haltiwanger, John, 1996. "Evidence on Macroeconomic Complementarities," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 78(1), pages 78-93, February.
  12. L. Blume, 2010. "The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 488, David K. Levine.
  13. Oddvar M. Kaarboe & Alexander F. Tieman, 1999. "Equilibrium Selection under Different Learning Modes in Supermodular Games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 99-061/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  14. Blanchard, Olivier Jean & Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro, 1987. "Monopolistic Competition and the Effects of Aggregate Demand," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(4), pages 647-66, September.
  15. Cooper, Russell, 1994. "Equilibrium Selection in Imperfectly Competitive Economies with Multiple Equilibria," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 104(426), pages 1106-22, September.
  16. Robles, Jack, 1997. "Evolution and Long Run Equilibria in Coordination Games with Summary Statistic Payoff Technologies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 180-193, July.
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Cited by:
  1. Jacques Durieu & Hans Haller & Philippe Solal, 2004. "Nonspecific Networking," Game Theory and Information 0403005, EconWPA.
  2. Durieu, Jacques & Haller, Hans & Solal, Philippe, 2005. "Interaction on Hypergraphs," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 05-34, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
  3. Jacques Durieu & Hans Haller & Philippe Solal, 2011. "Nonspecific Networking," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 2(1), pages 87-113, February.

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