We examine an evolutionary model of equilibrium selection, where all individuals interact w ith each other, recurrently playing a strictly supermodular game. Individuals play (myopic)\best responses to the current population profile, occasionally they pick an arbitrary strategy at random. To address the robustness of equilibrium selection in this simultaneous play senario, we investigate whether different best-response approximations can lead to different long run equilibria.
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Paper provided by University of Dortmund, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers in Economics with number
04_05.
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