Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

A characterization of strategic complementarities

Contents:

Author Info

  • Echenique, Federico

Abstract

I characterize games for which there is an order on strategies such that the game has strategic complementarities. I prove that, with some qualifications, games with a unique equilibrium have complementarities if and only if Cournot best-response dynamics has no cycles; and that all games with multiple equilibria have complementarities. This is a negative result because it implies that the predictive power of complementarities alone is very weak. As an application of my results I show that generic 2 X 2 games either have no pure-strategy equilibria, or are GSC.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WFW-49BS9RM-3/2/38229d97a07040bcff83f5ed5abc10ea
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 46 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
Pages: 325-347

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:46:y:2004:i:2:p:325-347

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Federico Echenique, 2003. "The equilibrium set of two-player games with complementarities is a sublattice," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 22(4), pages 903-905, November.
  2. Vives, X., 1988. "Nash Equilibrium With Strategic Complementarities," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 107-88, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  3. Federico Echenique & Aaron Edlin, 2003. "Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complements Are Unstable," Game Theory and Information 0303003, EconWPA.
  4. Federico Echenique, 2002. "Finding All Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000059, David K. Levine.
  5. Federico Echenique, 2002. "Comparative Statics by Adaptive Dynamics and the Correspondence Principle," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(2), pages 833-844, March.
  6. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 124-143, May.
  7. Rabah Amir, 2000. "On the Effects of Entry in Cournot Markets," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1475, Econometric Society.
  8. Milgrom, P. & Shannon, C., 1991. "Monotone Comparative Statics," Papers 11, Stanford - Institute for Thoretical Economics.
  9. Lippman, Steven A. & Mamer, John W. & McCardle, Kevin F., 1987. "Comparative statics in non-cooperative games via transfinitely iterated play," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 288-303, April.
  10. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2000. "Global Games: Theory and Applications," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1275, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  11. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1994. "Comparing Equilibria," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 441-59, June.
  12. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1255-77, November.
  13. Zhou Lin, 1994. "The Set of Nash Equilibria of a Supermodular Game Is a Complete Lattice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 295-300, September.
  14. AMIR, Rabah, 1994. "Cournot Oligopoly and the Theory of Supermodular Games," CORE Discussion Papers 1994013, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  15. Villas-Boas, J. Miguel, 1997. "Comparative Statics of Fixed Points," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 183-198, March.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Sunanda Roy & Tarun Sabarwal, 2010. "Characterizing Stability Properties in Games with Strategic Substitutes," WORKING PAPERS SERIES IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ECONOMICS 201003, University of Kansas, Department of Economics, revised Oct 2011.
  2. Jeremy Fox & Natalia Lazzati, 2013. "Identification of discrete choice models for bundles and binary games," CeMMAP working papers CWP04/13, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
  3. AMIR, Rabah & GARCIA, Filomena & KNAUFF, Malgorzata, 2006. "Endogenous heterogeneity in strategic models: symmetry-breaking via strategic substitutes and nonconcavities," CORE Discussion Papers 2006008, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. Takahashi, Satoru, 2008. "The number of pure Nash equilibria in a random game with nondecreasing best responses," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 328-340, May.
  5. Amir, Rabah, 2005. "Ordinal versus cardinal complementarity: The case of Cournot oligopoly," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 1-14, October.
  6. Berger, Ulrich, 2009. "The convergence of fictitious play in games with strategic complementarities: A Comment," MPRA Paper 20241, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. AMIR, Rabah, 2003. "Supermodularity and complementarity in economics: an elementary survey," CORE Discussion Papers 2003104, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  8. Tang, Pingzhong & Lin, Fangzhen, 2011. "Two equivalence results for two-person strict games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 479-486, March.
  9. TESORIERE, Antonio, 2005. "Endogenous R&D symmetry in linear duopoly with one-way spillovers," CORE Discussion Papers 2005045, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:46:y:2004:i:2:p:325-347. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.