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Minimality of Consistent Solutions for Strategic Games, in Particular for Potential Games

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Author Info
Peleg, Bezalel
Potters, Jos A M
Tijs, Stef H

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Abstract

Solutions defined on classes of strategic games, satisfying One-Person Rationality (OPR), Non-emptiness (NEM) and Consistency (CONS) are considered. The main question to be answered is whether these conditions characterize the Nash Equilibrium solution NE for the given class of games. Depending on the structure of the class of games positive as well as negative answers are obtained. A graph-theoretical framework will be developed to express sufficient conditions for a positive or a negative answer. For the class of (finite) strategic games with at least one Nash equilibrium the answer is positive. For several classes of potential games the answer is negative.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 7 (1996)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 81-93
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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:7:y:1996:i:1:p:81-93

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  1. Voorneveld, M. & Vermeulen, D. & Borm, P., 1997. "Axiomatizations of Pareto equilibria in multicriteria games," Research Memorandum 749, Tilburg University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Voorneveld, Mark & Kets, Willemien & Norde, Henk, 2005. "An axiomatization of minimal curb sets," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 589, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 18 Mar 2005. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Heumen, R. van, 1994. "Characterizations of Solutions for Bayesian Games," Research Memorandum 680, Tilburg University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration. [Downloadable!]
  4. Megen, F. van & Facchini, G. & Borm, P., 1996. "Strong Nash equilibria and the potential maximizer," Discussion Paper 13, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  5. Suijs, J. & Hamers, H. & Tijs, S., 1995. "On Consistency of Reward Allocation Rules in Sequencing Situations," Discussion Paper 18, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  6. Voorneveld, M. & Borm, P. & Megen, F. van, 1999. "Congestion games and potentials reconsidered," Discussion Paper 98, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  7. Koji Takamiya, 2006. "Consistency and Unanimity in the House Allocation Problems I: Collective Initial Endowments," ISER Discussion Paper 0657, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University. [Downloadable!]
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