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Abstract

In a (generalized symmetric aggregative game, payoffs depend only on individual strategy and an aggregate of all strategies. Players behaving as if they were negligible would optimize taking the aggregate as given. We provide evolutionary and dynamic foundations for such behavior when the game satisfies supermodularity conditions. The results obteined are also useful to characterize evolutionarily stable strategies in a finite population.

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File URL: http://homepage.univie.ac.at/Papers.Econ/RePEc/vie/viennp/vie0216.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Vienna, Department of Economics in its series Vienna Economics Papers with number 0216.

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Date of creation: Dec 2002
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Handle: RePEc:vie:viennp:0216

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Web page: http://www.univie.ac.at/vwl

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Find related papers by JEL classification:

• C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
• D41 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Perfect Competition
• D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

References

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1. Rabah Amir & Val E. Lambson, 1998. "On the Effects of Entry in Cournot Markets," CIE Discussion Papers 1998-06, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
   
   • Amir, Rabah & Lambson, Val E, 2000. "On the Effects of Entry in Cournot Markets," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(2), pages 235-54, April.
   • AMIR, Rabah & LAMBSON, Val, 1999. "On the effects of entry in Cournot markets," CORE Discussion Papers 1999059, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
   • Rabah Amir, 2000. "On the Effects of Entry in Cournot Markets," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1475, Econometric Society.
2. Schaffer, Mark E., 1989. "Are profit-maximisers the best survivors? : A Darwinian model of economic natural selection," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 29-45, August.
3. Milgrom, P. & Shannon, C., 1991. "Monotone Comparative Statics," Papers 11, Stanford - Institute for Thoretical Economics.
   
   • Milgrom, Paul & Shannon, Chris, 1994. "Monotone Comparative Statics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(1), pages 157-80, January.
4. Sethi, Rajiv & Somanathan, E., 2001. "Preference Evolution and Reciprocity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 273-297, April.
   
   • Rajiv Sethi & E. Somanathan, 1999. "Preference Evolution and Reciprocity," Game Theory and Information 9903001, EconWPA, revised 12 Mar 1999.
5. Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215.
6. Amir, Rabah, 1996. "Cournot Oligopoly and the Theory of Supermodular Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 132-148, August.
   
   • AMIR, Rabah, 1994. "Cournot Oligopoly and the Theory of Supermodular Games," CORE Discussion Papers 1994013, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
7. P. Diamond, 1980. "Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium," Working papers 268, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
   
   • Diamond, Peter A, 1982. "Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(5), pages 881-94, October.
8. Schenk-Hoppe, Klaus Reiner, 2000. "The evolution of Walrasian behavior in oligopolies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 35-55, February.
9. Dubey, Pradeep & Mas-Colell, Andreau & Shubik, Martin, 1980. "Efficiency properties of strategies market games: An axiomatic approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 339-362, April.
10. Burkhard Hehenkamp & Wolfgang Leininger & Alex Possajennikov, 2001. "Evolutionary Rent-Seeking," CESifo Working Paper Series 620, CESifo Group Munich.
11. Fernando Vega Redondo, 1996. "The evolution of walrasian behavior," Working Papers. Serie AD 1996-05, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    
    • Fernando Vega-Redondo, 1997. "The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(2), pages 375-384, March.
12. Xavier Vives, 2001. "Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 026272040x.

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Citations

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Cited by:

1. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Ana B. Ania, 2003. "The Asset Market Game," Vienna Economics Papers 0320, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
   
   • Alos-Ferrer, Carlos & Ania, Ana B., 2005. "The asset market game," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1-2), pages 67-90, February.
2. Adelina Gschwandtner, 2004. "Profit Persistence in the "Very" Long Run: Evidence from Survivors and Exiters," Vienna Economics Papers 0401, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
   
   • Adelina Gschwandtner, 2005. "Profit persistence in the 'very' long run: evidence from survivors and exiters," Applied Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 37(7), pages 793-806.
3. Jacques Durieu & Hans Haller & Philippe Solal, 2004. "Nonspecific Networking," Game Theory and Information 0403005, EconWPA.

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