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Mistakes in Cooperation: the Stochastic Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Roberto Serrano
Oscar Volij
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We analyse a dynamic trading process of coalitional recontracting in an exchange economy with indivisible goods, where agents may make mistakes with small probability. According to this process, the resistance of a transition from one allocation to another is a function of the number of agents who make mistakes and of the seriousness of each mistake. If preferences are always strict, the unique stochastically stable state is the competitive equilibrium allocation. In economies with indifferences, non-core cycles are sometimes stochastically stable, while some core allocations are not. The robustness of these results is confirmed in a weak coalitional recontracting process. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2008.
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Article provided by Royal Economic Society in its journal The Economic Journal .
Volume (Year): 118 (2008)
Issue (Month): 532 (October)
Pages: 1719-1741
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Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:118:y:2008:i:532:p:1719-1741Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.res.org.uk/ More information through EDIRC
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Paper Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 2005.
"Mistakes In Cooperation: The Stochastic Stability Of Edgeworth'S Recontracting ,"
Economics Working Papers
we056332, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
[Downloadable!] Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 2003.
"MISTAKE IN COOPERATION:the Stochastic Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting ,"
Working Papers
2003-23, Brown University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 2003.
"Mistakes in Cooperation: the Stochastic Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting ,"
Economics Working Papers
0029, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
[Downloadable!] References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Michihiro Kandori & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 2004.
"Decentralized Trade, Random Utility and the Evolution of Social Welfare ,"
Economics Working Papers
0042, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
KANDORI, Michihiro & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, .
"Decentralized Trade, Random Utility and the Evolution of Social Welfare ,"
Economic theory and game theory
021, Oscar Volij.
[Downloadable!] Michihiro Kandori & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 2004.
"Decentralized Trade, Random Utility and the Evolution of Social Welfare ,"
Working Papers
2004-06, Brown University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Michihiro Kandori & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 2004.
"Decentralized Trade, Random Utility and the Evolution of Social Welfare ,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-286, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
[Downloadable!] Michihiro Kandori & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 2005.
"Decentralized Trade, Random Utility And The Evolution Of Social Welfare ,"
Economics Working Papers
we056433, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
[Downloadable!] Kandori, Michihiro & Serrano, Roberto & Volij, Oscar, 2008.
"Decentralized trade, random utility and the evolution of social welfare ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 140(1), pages 328-338, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Perry, Motty & Reny, Philip J, 1994.
"A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 795-817, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Shapley, Lloyd & Scarf, Herbert, 1974.
"On cores and indivisibility ,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 23-37, March.
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Bergin, James & Lipman, Barton L, 1996.
"Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 64(4), pages 943-56, July.
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Other versions: Oscar Volij, 2000.
"The Evolution of Exchange ,"
Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers
0292, Econometric Society.
[Downloadable!]
Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 1996.
"Bargaining, Coalitions and Competition ,"
Economics Working Papers
178, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Volij, Oscar & Serrano, Roberto & Dagan, Nir, 2002.
"Bargaining, Coalitions and Competition ,"
Staff General Research Papers
5107, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 1996.
"Bargaining, Coalitions, and Competition ,"
Economic theory and game theory
014, Nir Dagan, revised May 1999.
[Downloadable!] Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 1996.
"Bargaining, Coalitions, and Competition ,"
Economic theory and game theory
003, Oscar Volij, revised Jul 1998.
[Downloadable!] Roberto Serrano & Assaf Ben-Shoham & Oscar Volij, 2000.
"The Evolution of Exchange ,"
Economic theory and game theory
012, Oscar Volij.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Volij, Oscar & Ben-Shoham, Asaf & Serrano, Roberto, 2003.
"The Evolution of Exchange ,"
Staff General Research Papers
10247, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
Ben-Shoham, Assaf & Serrano, Roberto & Volij, Oscar, 2004.
"The evolution of exchange ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 114(2), pages 310-328, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Armando Gomes & Philippe Jehiel, 2005.
"Dynamic Processes of Social and Economic Interactions: On the Persistence of Inefficiencies ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(3), pages 626-667, June.
Other versions: Robert M. Anderson & William R. Zame, 1997.
"Edgeworth's Conjecture with Infinitely Many Commodities: L1 ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 65(2), pages 225-274, March.
Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993.
"Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Fernando Vega-Redondo, 1997.
"The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 65(2), pages 375-384, March.
Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997.
"Evolutionary Game Theory ,"
MIT Press Books ,
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Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 1-41, May.
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Other versions: Feldman, Allan M, 1974.
"Recontracting Stability ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 42(1), pages 35-44, January.
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Manelli, Alejandro M, 1991.
"Monotonic Preferences and Core Equivalence ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 59(1), pages 123-38, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Assaf Ben-Shoham & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volig, 2000.
"The Evolution of Change ,"
Working Papers
2000-06, Brown University, Department of Economics.
Young, H Peyton, 1993.
"The Evolution of Conventions ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
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Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra, 2001.
"Coalitional Power and Public Goods ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(6), pages 1355-1384, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2004.
"Kidney Exchange ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 119(2), pages 457-488, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Green, Jerry R, 1974.
"The Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting Process ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 42(1), pages 21-34, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra & Oscar Volij, 2001.
"On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 69(6), pages 1685-1696, November.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra & Oscar Volij, 1999.
"On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information ,"
Economic theory and game theory
011, Oscar Volij.
[Downloadable!] Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra & Oscar Volij, 1999.
"On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information ,"
Working Papers
99-22, Brown University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra & Oscar Volij, 2000.
"On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information ,"
Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers
0141, Econometric Society.
[Downloadable!] Anderson, Robert M., 1992.
"The core in perfectly competitive economies ,"
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications ,
in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 14, pages 413-457
Elsevier.
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Roth, Alvin E. & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1977.
"Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods ,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 131-137, August.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Michihiro Kandori & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 2005.
"Decentralized Trade, Random Utility And The Evolution Of Social Welfare ,"
Economics Working Papers
we056433, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
KANDORI, Michihiro & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, .
"Decentralized Trade, Random Utility and the Evolution of Social Welfare ,"
Economic theory and game theory
021, Oscar Volij.
[Downloadable!] Michihiro Kandori & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 2004.
"Decentralized Trade, Random Utility and the Evolution of Social Welfare ,"
Economics Working Papers
0042, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
[Downloadable!] Michihiro Kandori & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 2004.
"Decentralized Trade, Random Utility and the Evolution of Social Welfare ,"
Working Papers
2004-06, Brown University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Michihiro Kandori & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 2004.
"Decentralized Trade, Random Utility and the Evolution of Social Welfare ,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-286, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
[Downloadable!] Kandori, Michihiro & Serrano, Roberto & Volij, Oscar, 2008.
"Decentralized trade, random utility and the evolution of social welfare ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 140(1), pages 328-338, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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