Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Stochastic Stability for Roommate Markets

Contents:

Author Info

  • Klaus, Bettina
  • Klijn, Flip
  • Walzl, Markus

    (METEOR)

Abstract

We show that for any roommate market the set of stochastically stable matchings coincideswith the set of absorbing matchings. This implies that whenever the core is non-empty (e.g.,for marriage markets), a matching is in the core if and only if it is stochastically stable, i.e., stochastic stability is a characteristic of the core. Several solution concepts have beenproposed to extend the core to all roommate markets (including those with an empty core).An important implication of our results is that the set of absorbing matchings is the onlysolution concept that is core consistent and shares the stochastic stability characteristic withthe core.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://edocs.ub.unimaas.nl/loader/file.asp?id=1308
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR) in its series Research Memorandum with number 010.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2008010

Contact details of provider:
Postal: P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht
Phone: +31 (0)43 38 83 830
Email:
Web page: http://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Economics (Jel: A);

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2009. "Smith and Rawls Share a Room: Stability and Medians," Harvard Business School Working Papers, Harvard Business School 09-111, Harvard Business School.
  2. Klaus, Bettina & Klijn, Flip, 2007. "Smith and Rawls Share a Room," Research Memorandum, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR) 026, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  3. E. Inarra & C. Larrea & E. Molis, 2008. "Random paths to P-stability in the roommate problem," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 461-471, March.
  4. Jackson, Matthew O. & Watts, Alison, 2002. "The Evolution of Social and Economic Networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 265-295, October.
  5. INARRA, Elena & LARREA, Conchi & MOLIS, Elena, 2010. "The stability of the roommate problem revisited," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 2010007, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  6. Diamantoudi, Effrosyni & Miyagawa, Eiichi & Xue, Licun, 2004. "Random paths to stability in the roommate problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 18-28, July.
  7. Bochet, Olivier & Klaus, Bettina & Walzl, Markus, 2007. "Dynamic Recontracting processes with Multiple Indivisible Goods," Research Memorandum, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR) 018, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  8. Tayfun Sönmez & Suryapratim Banerjee & Hideo Konishi, 2001. "Core in a simple coalition formation game," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 135-153.
  9. Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 2003. "MISTAKE IN COOPERATION:the Stochastic Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting," Working Papers 2003-23, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  10. Roth, Alvin E & Vande Vate, John H, 1990. "Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1475-80, November.
  11. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
  12. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Jackson, Matthew O., 2002. "The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 201-230, February.
  13. M.Utku Unver & Fuhito Kojima, 2006. "Random Paths to Pairwise Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Problems: A Study on Market Equilibration," Working Papers, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics 256, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2006.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Bettina Klaus & Jonathan Newton, 2014. "Stochastic Stability in Assignment Problems," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP), Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP 14.02, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  2. Ana Mauleon & Nils Roehl & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2014. "Constitutions and Social Networks," Working Papers Dissertations 02, University of Paderborn, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics.
  3. Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn & Markus Walzl, 2011. "Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 13(6), pages 921-933, December.
  4. Péter Biró & Gethin Norman, 2013. "Analysis of stochastic matching markets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 42(4), pages 1021-1040, November.
  5. Iñarra, E. & Larrea, C. & Molis, E., 2013. "Absorbing sets in roommate problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 165-178.
  6. Boncinelli, Leonardo & Pin, Paolo, 2014. "Efficiency and Stability in a Process of Teams Formation," MPRA Paper 56356, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Özkal-Sanver, Ipek, 2010. "Impossibilities for roommate problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 59(3), pages 360-363, May.
  8. Newton, Jonathan & Sawa, Ryoji, 2013. "A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems," Working Papers, University of Sydney, School of Economics 2013-09, University of Sydney, School of Economics, revised Jul 2014.
  9. repec:pdn:wpaper:74 is not listed on IDEAS

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2008010. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Charles Bollen).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.