Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration

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Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration

Author Info

Fuhito Kojima ()
M. Ünver ()

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Utku Unver

Abstract

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 36 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (March)
Pages: 473-488
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:36:y:2008:i:3:p:473-488

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Paper
- M.Utku Unver & Fuhito Kojima, 2006. "Random Paths to Pairwise Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Problems: A Study on Market Equilibration," Working Papers 256, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2006. [Downloadable!]

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Echenique, Federico & Oviedo, Jorge, 2006. "A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets," Theoretical Economics, Society for Economic Theory, vol. 1(2), pages 233-273, June. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Federico Echenique & Jorge Oviedo, 2004. "A Theory of Stability in Many-to-many Matching Markets," Game Theory and Information 0401002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
- Jorge Oviedo & Federico Echenique, 2005. "A Theory of Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Markets," 2005 Meeting Papers 233, Society for Economic Dynamics. [Downloadable!]
- Echenique, Federico & Oviedo, Jorge, 2003. "A Theory of Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Markets," Working Papers 1185, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
- Federico Echenique & Jorge Oviedo, 2003. "A Theory of Stability in Many-to-many Matching Markets," Levine's Working Paper Archive 666156000000000374, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
John William Hatfield & Paul R. Milgrom, 2005. "Matching with Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 913-935, September. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Paul Milgrom, 2003. "Matching with Contracts," Working Papers 03003, Stanford University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Chung, Kim-Sau, 2000. "On the Existence of Stable Roommate Matchings," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 206-230, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Roth, Alvin E, 1984. "Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 47-57, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2004. "Paths to Stability for Matching Markets with Couples," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 604.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), revised 01 Dec 2005. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Klaus, Bettina & Klijn, Flip, 2007. "Paths to stability for matching markets with couples," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 154-171, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Hideo Konishi & M. Utku Ünver, 2003. "Credible Group Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Problems," Game Theory and Information 0309005, EconWPA, revised 06 Sep 2003. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Hideo Konishi & M. Utku Unver, 2003. "Credible Group-Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Problems," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 570, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 19 Jan 2005. [Downloadable!]
- Konishi, Hideo & Unver, M. Utku, 2006. "Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 129(1), pages 57-80, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Jackson, Matthew O. & Wolinsky, Asher, 1996. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 44-74, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 1995. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Discussion Papers 1098R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
- Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 1994. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Discussion Papers 1098, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]

Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Boyle, Elette & Echenique, Federico, 2007. "Sequential entry in many-to-one matching markets," Working Papers 1269, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Elette Boyle & Federico Echenique, 2009. "Sequential entry in many-to-one matching markets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 87-99, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
James W. Boudreau, 2008. "Preference Structure and Random Paths to Stability in Matching Markets," Working papers 2008-29, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- James Boudreau, 2008. "Preference Structure and Random Paths to Stability in Matching Markets," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 3(67), pages 1-12. [Downloadable!]
Klaus, Bettina & Klijn, Flip & Walzl, Markus, 2008. "Stochastic Stability for Roommate Markets," Research Memoranda 010, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]

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This page was last updated on 2009-10-18.

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