Dynamics, stability, and foresight in the Shapley-Scarf housing market
AbstractWhile most of the literature starting with Shapley and Scarf (1974) have considered a static exchange economy with indivisibilities, this paper studies the dynamics of such an economy. We find that both the dynamics generated by competitive equilibrium and the one generated by the weak dominance relation, converge to a set of allocations we define as strictly stable, which we can show to exist. Moreover, we show that even when only pairwise exchanges between two traders are allowed, the strictly stable allocations are attained eventually if traders are sufficiently farsighted.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.
Volume (Year): 46 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco
Indivisible goods market Dynamics Competitive allocation Strict core Foresight Stable set;
Other versions of this item:
- Yoshio Kamijo & Ryo Kawasaki, 2009. "Dynamics, Stability, and Foresight in the Shapley-Scarf Housing Market," Working Papers 2009.51, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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"Random paths to stability in the roommate problem,"
0102-65, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
- Sotomayor, Marilda, 2005. "An elementary non-constructive proof of the non-emptiness of the core of the Housing Market of Shapley and Scarf," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 298-303, November.
- Shapley, Lloyd & Scarf, Herbert, 1974. "On cores and indivisibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 23-37, March.
- John C. Harsanyi, 1974. "An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 20(11), pages 1472-1495, July.
- Morimitsu Kurino, 2014. "House Allocation with Overlapping Generations," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 258-89, February.
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