Dynamics, Stability, and Foresight in the Shapley-Scarf Housing Market
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- Kamijo, Yoshio & Kawasaki, Ryo, 2010. "Dynamics, stability, and foresight in the Shapley-Scarf housing market," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 214-222, March.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Morimitsu Kurino, 2014. "House Allocation with Overlapping Generations," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 258-289, February.
- Kawasaki, Ryo, 2015. "Roth–Postlewaite stability and von Neumann–Morgenstern stability," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 1-6.
More about this item
KeywordsIndivisible Goods Market; Dynamics; Competitive Allocation; Strict Core; Foresight; Stable Set;
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-07-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2009-07-28 (Game Theory)
- NEP-URE-2009-07-28 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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