This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

Oscar Volij

Economic theory and game theory

Contact information of Oscar Volij:
Postal: Oscar Volij, Department of Economics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 91905 Jerusalem, Israel
Web page: http://volij.co.il/

Order information:
Web: http://volij.co.il/addr.html
For technical questions regarding this series, please contact (Oscar Volij)
Series handle: repec:nid:ovolij

2002

016 A Remark on Bargaining and Non-Expected Utility
by Oscar Volij [Downloadable!]
015 The Measurement of Intellectual Influence
by Ignacio Palacios-Huerta & Oscar Volij [Downloadable!]

2001

014 The Time-Preference Nash Solution
by Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij & Eyal Winter [Downloadable!]
013 A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution
by Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij & Eyal Winter [Downloadable!]

2000

012 The Evolution of Exchange
by Roberto Serrano & Assaf Ben-Shoham & Oscar Volij [Downloadable!]

1999

011 On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information
by Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra & Oscar Volij [Downloadable!]
010 On Risk Aversion and Bargaining Outcomes
by Oscar Volij [Downloadable!]
009 Utility Equivalence in Sealed Bid Auctions and the Dual Theory of Choice Under Risk
by Oscar Volij [Downloadable!]
008 Public Education, Communities, and Vouchers
by María J. Luengo Prado & Oscar Volij [Downloadable!]

1998

007 In Defense of DEFECT or Cooperation does not Justify the Solution Concept
by Oscar Volij [Downloadable!]
006 Communication, Credible Improvements and the Core of an Economy with Asymmetric Information
by Oscar Volij [Downloadable!]

1997

005 The Core of Economies with Asymmetric Information: An Axiomatic Approach
by Darin Lee & Oscar Volij [Downloadable!]
004 Will You Marry Me? A Perspective on the Gender Gap
by Ronel Elul & José Silva-Reus & Oscar Volij [Downloadable!]

1996

003 Bargaining, Coalitions, and Competition
by Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij [Downloadable!]

1995

002 Formation of Nations in a Welfare State Minded World
by Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij [Downloadable!]

Undated

001 Comment on McLennan and Sonnenschein "Sequential Bargaining as a Non-Cooperative Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium"
by Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij [Downloadable!]

Access and download statistics

Did you know? RePEc and its associated services are free for contributors and users, and do not accept any advertising.

This page was last updated on 2008-8-5.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.