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Will You Marry Me? A Perspective on the Gender Gap

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Author Info

  • Ronel Elul

    (Department of Economics, Brown University.)

  • Jose Silva-Reus

    (Departamento de Fundamentos del Analisis Economico, Universidad de Alicante, Spain.)

  • Oscar Volij

    (Department of Economics, Brown University, and Department of Economics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem.)

Abstract

This paper develops a general equilibrium model of the gender wage gap. The difference in earnings is a consequence of a demographic regularity --- that men tend to marry younger women --- which limits women's labor mobility. However, couples are always free not to marry, and do so only if it is in each's self-interest. In our model, marriage is beneficial because the joint consumption is a household public good. The intrafamily allocation of resources is determined via noncooperative bargaining; this leads to interesting interactions between the game played by husband and wife on the one hand, and the competitive environment in which they are immersed on the other. One example of this is the gender gap.

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File URL: http://volij.co.il/publications/papers/marry.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Oscar Volij in its series Economic theory and game theory with number 004.

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Date of creation: 29 May 1997
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Publication status: Published in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 49(4), 549-572, 2002.
Handle: RePEc:nid:ovolij:004

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Postal: Oscar Volij, Department of Economics, Ben-Gurion University, Beer-Sheva 84105, Israel
Web page: http://volij.co.il/

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Web: http://volij.co.il/addr.html

Related research

Keywords: Gender gap; bargaining; household models; overlapping generations.;

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References

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  1. Patrick Francois, 1996. "A Theory of Gender Discrimination Based on the Household," Working Papers 929, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  2. Rosenzweig, Mark R & Stark, Oded, 1989. "Consumption Smoothing, Migration, and Marriage: Evidence from Rural India," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(4), pages 905-26, August.
  3. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, December.
  4. Goldin, Claudia, 1986. "Monitoring Costs and Occupational Segregation by Sex: A Historical Analysis," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 4(1), pages 1-27, January.
  5. Bergstrom, Theodore C., 1993. "A survey of theories of the family," Handbook of Population and Family Economics, in: M. R. Rosenzweig & Stark, O. (ed.), Handbook of Population and Family Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 21-79 Elsevier.
  6. Mincer, Jacob, 1978. "Family Migration Decisions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 86(5), pages 749-73, October.
  7. Cristina Echevarria & Antonio Merlo, 1995. "Gender differences in education in a dynamic household bargaining model," Staff Report 195, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  8. Galor, Oded & Weil, David, 1995. "The Gender Gap, Fertility and Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers 1157, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1982. "A model of employment outcomes illustrating the effect of the structure of information on the level and distribution of income," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 10(3-4), pages 231-236.
  10. Becker, Gary S, 1973. "A Theory of Marriage: Part I," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 813-46, July-Aug..
  11. Hadfield, Gillian K., 1999. "A coordination model of the sexual division of labor," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 125-153, October.
  12. Bergstrom, T. & Bagnoli, M., 1990. "Courtship as a Waiting Game," Papers 90-12, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
  13. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "A Theory of Marriage: Part II," NBER Chapters, in: Marriage, Family, Human Capital, and Fertility, pages 11-26 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Frank, Robert H, 1978. "Family Location Constraints and the Geographic Distribution of Female Professionals," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 86(1), pages 117-30, February.
  15. Frank, Robert H, 1978. "Why Women Earn Less: The Theory and Estimation of Differential Overqualification," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(3), pages 360-73, June.
  16. Maxim Engers & Steven Stern, 2002. "Long-Term Care and Family Bargaining," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(1), pages 73-114, February.
  17. Keeley, Michael C, 1977. "The Economics of Family Formation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 15(2), pages 238-50, April.
  18. Aloysius Siow, 1998. "Differential Fecundity, Markets, and Gender Roles," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(2), pages 334-354, April.
  19. Gunderson, Morley, 1989. "Male-Female Wage Differentials and Policy Responses," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 27(1), pages 46-72, March.
  20. Galor, Oded & Ryder, Harl E., 1989. "Existence, uniqueness, and stability of equilibrium in an overlapping-generations model with productive capital," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 360-375, December.
  21. Engineer, Merwan & Welling, Linda, 1999. "Human capital, true love, and gender roles: is sex destiny?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 155-178, October.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Miriam Beblo & Julio R. Robledo, 2003. "The wage gap and the leisure gap for double earner couples," Vienna Economics Papers 0404, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
  2. Elisabeth Hermann Frederiksen, 2006. "An Equilibrium Analysis of the Gender Wage Gap," EPRU Working Paper Series 06-08, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  3. Bowles, Hannah Riley & McGinn, Kathleen L., 2007. "Untapped Potential in the Study of Negotiation and Gender Inequality in Organizations," Working Paper Series rwp07-062, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.

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