A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution
AbstractWe characterize the Nash bargaining solution replacing the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives with three independent axioms: Independence of Non-Individually Rational Alternatives, Twisting and Disagreement Point Convexity. We give a non-cooperative bargaining interpretation to this last axiom.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Oscar Volij in its series Economic theory and game theory with number 013.
Date of creation: 09 Jan 2001
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Social Choice and Welfare, 19, 811-823, (2002).
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Oscar Volij, Department of Economics, Ben-Gurion University, Beer-Sheva 84105, Israel
Web page: http://volij.co.il/
Other versions of this item:
- Eyal Winter & Oscar Volij & Nir Dagan, 2002. "A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 811-823.
- Volij, Oscar & Dagan, Nir & Winter, Eyal, 2002. "A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution," Staff General Research Papers 5259, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij & Eyal Winter, 2000. "A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution," Economic theory and game theory 018, Nir Dagan, revised 21 Sep 2000.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
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