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A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution

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  • Nir Dagan
  • Oscar Volij

    (Department of Economics, Brown University, and Department of Economics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem.)

  • Eyal Winter

    (Department of Economics, Hebrew University.)

Abstract

We characterize the Nash bargaining solution replacing the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives with three independent axioms: Independence of Non-Individually Rational Alternatives, Twisting and Disagreement Point Convexity. We give a non-cooperative bargaining interpretation to this last axiom.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Oscar Volij in its series Economic theory and game theory with number 013.

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Date of creation: 09 Jan 2001
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Publication status: Published in Social Choice and Welfare, 19, 811-823, (2002).
Handle: RePEc:nid:ovolij:013

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Postal: Oscar Volij, Department of Economics, Ben-Gurion University, Beer-Sheva 84105, Israel
Web page: http://volij.co.il/

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Keywords: bargaining; Nash bargaining solution.;

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References

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  1. Ehud Kalai & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1976. "Arbitration of Two-Party Disputes Under Ignorance," Discussion Papers 215, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
  3. Kalai, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Meir, 1975. "Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 513-18, May.
  4. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
  5. Marco Mariotti, 1998. "Fair Bargains: Distributive Justice and Nash Bargaining Theory," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 98/16, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Feb 1998.
  6. Lensberg, Terje, 1988. "Stability and the Nash solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 330-341, August.
  7. Chun, Youngsub & Thomson, William, 1990. "Nash solution and uncertain disagreement points," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 213-223, September.
  8. Peters, Hans J M, 1986. "Simultaneity of Issues and Additivity in Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(1), pages 153-69, January.
  9. Thomson, W., 1989. "Cooperative Models Of Bargaining," RCER Working Papers 177, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  10. Eric van Damme, 1984. "The Nash Bargaining Solution is Optimal," Discussion Papers 597, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  11. Marco Mariotti, 2000. "Maximal symmetry and the Nash solution," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 45-53.
  12. Damme, E.E.C. van & Peters, H., 1991. "Characterizing the Nash and Raiffa bargaining solutions by disagreement point axioms," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154419, Tilburg University.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij & Eyal Winter, 2001. "The Time-Preference Nash Solution," Discussion Paper Series dp265, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  2. Haruo Imai & Hannu Salonen, 2009. "Limit Solutions for Finite Horizon Bargaining Problems," Discussion Papers 51, Aboa Centre for Economics.
  3. Geoffroy Clippel, 2007. "An axiomatization of the Nash bargaining solution," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 201-210, September.
  4. Xu, Yongsheng, 2012. "Symmetry-based compromise and the Nash solution to convex bargaining problems," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 115(3), pages 484-486.
  5. Frank A. Schmid, 2001. "Equity financing of the entrepreneurial firm," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Nov., pages 15-28.
  6. Abraham Diskin & Dan S. Felsenthal, 2007. "Individual rationality and bargaining," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24233, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  7. Kıbrıs, Özgür & Tapkı, İpek Gürsel, 2011. "Bargaining with nonanonymous disagreement: Decomposable rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 151-161.
  8. Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2011. "Disagreement point axioms and the egalitarian bargaining solution," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 63-85, February.
  9. Vartiainen, Hannu, 2007. "Collective choice with endogenous reference outcome," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 172-180, January.
  10. KIbrIs, Özgür & TapkI, Ipek Gürsel, 2010. "Bargaining with nonanonymous disagreement: Monotonic rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 233-241, January.

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