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Fair Bargains: Distributive Justice and Nash Bargaining Theory

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Author Info
Marco Mariotti (Economics Department, Queen Mary, University of London)

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Abstract

The Suppes-Sen dominance relation is a weak and widely accepted criterion of distributive justice. I propose its application to Nash bargaining theory. The Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) is characterised by replacing the controversial Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axiom with an axiom embodying the Suppes-Sen principle. The characterisation is more robust than the standard one with respect to variations in the domain of bargaining problems. It is also shown that a subset of Nash's axioms imply the Suppes-Sen relation.

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File URL: http://www.rhul.ac.uk/economics/Research/WorkingPapers/pdf/dpe9816.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London in its series Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics with number 98/16.

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Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: Feb 1998
Date of revision: Feb 1998
Handle: RePEc:hol:holodi:9816

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Roth, Alvin E, 1979. "Proportional Solutions to the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 775-77, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Myerson, Roger B, 1981. "Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, and the Timing Effect in Social Choice Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(4), pages 883-97, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Thomson, A., 1989. "The Consistency Principle," RCER Working Papers 192, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Yongsheng Xu & Naoki Yoshihara, 2004. "Nonconvex Bargaining Problems," Discussion Paper Series a454, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
  2. Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij & Eyal Winter, 2000. "A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution," Economic theory and game theory 018, Nir Dagan, revised 21 Sep 2000. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Dillenberger, David & Sadowski, Philipp, 2008. "Ashamed to be Selfish," MPRA Paper 8343, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Michele Lombardi & Naoki Yoshihara, 2008. "Alternative Characterizations of the Proportional Solution for Nonconvex Bargaining Problems with Claims," Discussion Paper Series a501, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Federico Valenciano & Annick Laruelle, 2005. "Bargaining In Committees Of Representatives: The Optimal Voting Rule," Working Papers. Serie AD 2005-24, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
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