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An axiomatization of the Euclidean compromise solution

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Author Info

  • Voorneveld, Mark

    ()
    (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics)

  • van den Nouweland, Anne

    (Department of Economics, University of Oregon)

  • McLean, Rich

    (Department of Economics, Rutgers University)

Abstract

The utopia point of a multicriteria optimization problem is the vector that specifies for each criterion the most favourable among the feasible values. The Euclidean compromise solution in multicriteria optimization is a solution concept that assigns to a feasible set the alternative with minimal Euclidean distance to the utopia point. The purpose of this paper is to provide a characterization of the Euclidean compromise solution. Consistency plays a crucial role in our approach.

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File URL: http://swopec.hhs.se/hastef/papers/hastef0703.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Stockholm School of Economics in its series Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance with number 703.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 13 Oct 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:hastef:0703

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Keywords: Consistency; Euclidean compromise solution; Multicriteria optimization;

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References

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  1. M. Freimer & P. L. Yu, 1976. "Some New Results on Compromise Solutions for Group Decision Problems," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 22(6), pages 688-693, February.
  2. P. L. Yu, 1973. "A Class of Solutions for Group Decision Problems," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 19(8), pages 936-946, April.
  3. Kalai, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Meir, 1975. "Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 513-18, May.
  4. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
  5. Andreas Pfingsten & Andreas Wagener, 2003. "Bargaining Solutions as Social Compromises," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 55(4), pages 359-389, December.
  6. Rubinstein, Ariel & Zhou, Lin, 1999. "Choice problems with a 'reference' point," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 205-209, May.
  7. Lensberg, Terje, 1988. "Stability and the Nash solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 330-341, August.
  8. Thomson, W., 1996. "Consistent Allocation Rules," RCER Working Papers 418, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
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Cited by:
  1. Christian Roessler, 2006. "Public Good Menus and Feature Complementarity," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 962, The University of Melbourne.

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