A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution

Author Info

Eyal Winter () (Department of Economics, Hebrew University, Jerusalem 91905, Israel)
Oscar Volij () (Department of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa 50011, USA)
Nir Dagan () (Academic Priority Ltd., Rashi 31, 52015 Ramat-Gan, Israel)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We characterize the Nash bargaining solution replacing the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives with three independent axioms: Independence of Non-Individually Rational Alternatives, Twisting, and Disagreement Point Convexity. We give a non-cooperative bargaining interpretation to this last axiom.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 19 (2002)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 811-823
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:19:y:2002:i:4:p:811-823

Note: Received: 4 September 2000/Accepted: 6 September 2001
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/index.htm

Order Information:
Web: http://link.springer.de/orders.htm

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Paper
- Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij & Eyal Winter, 2000. "A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution," Economic theory and game theory 018, Nir Dagan, revised 21 Sep 2000. [Downloadable!]
- Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij & Eyal Winter, 2001. "A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution," Economic theory and game theory 013, Oscar Volij. [Downloadable!]
- Volij, Oscar & Dagan, Nir & Winter, Eyal, 2002. "A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution," Staff General Research Papers 5259, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Peters, Hans J M, 1986. "Simultaneity of Issues and Additivity in Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(1), pages 153-69, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Mariotti, Marco, 1999. "Fair Bargains: Distributive Justice and Nash Bargaining Theory," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(3), pages 733-41, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Marco Mariotti, 1998. "Fair Bargains: Distributive Justice and Nash Bargaining Theory," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 98/16, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Feb 1998. [Downloadable!]
Marco Mariotti, 2000. "Maximal symmetry and the Nash solution," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 45-53. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ken Binmore & Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1986. "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 176-188, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ehud Kalai & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1976. "Arbitration of Two-Party Disputes Under Ignorance," Discussion Papers 215, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Kalai, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Meir, 1975. "Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 513-18, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Lensberg, Terje, 1988. "Stability and the Nash solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 330-341, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Thomson, William, 1994. "Cooperative models of bargaining," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 35, pages 1237-1284 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Thomson, W., 1989. "Cooperative Models Of Bargaining," RCER Working Papers 177, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
Chun, Youngsub & Thomson, William, 1990. "Nash solution and uncertain disagreement points," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 213-223, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Chun, Y. & Thomson, W., 1988. "Nash Solution And Uncertain Disagreement Points," RCER Working Papers 134, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).

Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Geoffroy de Clippel, 2004. "An Axiomatization of the Nash Bargaining Solution," Working Papers 2004-17, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Geoffroy Clippel, 2007. "An axiomatization of the Nash bargaining solution," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 201-210, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Haruo Imai & Hannu Salonen, 2009. "Limit Solutions for Finite Horizon Bargaining Problems," Discussion Papers 51, Aboa Centre for Economics. [Downloadable!]
Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij & Eyal Winter, 2001. "The time-preference Nash solution," Economic theory and game theory 019, Nir Dagan. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij & Eyal Winter, 2001. "The Time-Preference Nash Solution," Economic theory and game theory 014, Oscar Volij. [Downloadable!]
- Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij & Eyal Winter, 2001. "The Time-Preference Nash Solution," Discussion Paper Series dp265, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
Frank A. Schmid, 2001. "Equity financing of the entrepreneurial firm," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Nov., pages 15-28. [Downloadable!]

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Did you know? The RePEc project started in 1997. Its precursor, NetEc, dates back to 1993.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-21.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.