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A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution

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  • Volij, Oscar
  • Dagan, Nir
  • Winter, Eyal

Abstract

We characterize the Nash bargaining solution replacing the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives with three independent axioms: Independence of Non-Individually Rational Alternatives, Twisting, and Disagreement Point Convexity. We give a non-cooperative bargaining interpretation to this last axiom.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Iowa State University, Department of Economics in its series Staff General Research Papers with number 5259.

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Date of creation: 01 Jan 2002
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Publication status: Published in Social Choice and Welfare 2002, vol. 19, pp. 811-823
Handle: RePEc:isu:genres:5259

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Postal: Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070
Phone: +1 515.294.6741
Fax: +1 515.294.0221
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Web page: http://www.econ.iastate.edu
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References

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  1. Thomson, William, 1994. "Cooperative models of bargaining," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 35, pages 1237-1284 Elsevier.
  2. Ehud Kalai & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1976. "Arbitration of Two-Party Disputes Under Ignorance," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 215, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  3. Mariotti, Marco, 1999. "Fair Bargains: Distributive Justice and Nash Bargaining Theory," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(3), pages 733-41, July.
  4. Chun, Youngsub & Thomson, William, 1990. "Nash solution and uncertain disagreement points," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 213-223, September.
  5. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
  6. Eric van Damme, 1984. "The Nash Bargaining Solution is Optimal," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 597, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  7. Kalai, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Meir, 1975. "Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 513-18, May.
  8. Lensberg, Terje, 1988. "Stability and the Nash solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 330-341, August.
  9. Damme, E.E.C. van & Peters, H., 1991. "Characterizing the Nash and Raiffa bargaining solutions by disagreement point axioms," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154419, Tilburg University.
  10. Peters, Hans J M, 1986. "Simultaneity of Issues and Additivity in Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 54(1), pages 153-69, January.
  11. Marco Mariotti, 2000. "Maximal symmetry and the Nash solution," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 45-53.
  12. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2011. "Disagreement point axioms and the egalitarian bargaining solution," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 63-85, February.
  2. KIbrIs, Özgür & TapkI, Ipek Gürsel, 2010. "Bargaining with nonanonymous disagreement: Monotonic rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 233-241, January.
  3. Frank A. Schmid, 2001. "Equity financing of the entrepreneurial firm," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Nov., pages 15-28.
  4. Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij & Eyal Winter, 2001. "The time-preference Nash solution," Economic theory and game theory, Nir Dagan 019, Nir Dagan.
  5. Xu, Yongsheng, 2012. "Symmetry-based compromise and the Nash solution to convex bargaining problems," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 115(3), pages 484-486.
  6. Haruo Imai & Hannu Salonen, 2009. "Limit Solutions for Finite Horizon Bargaining Problems," Discussion Papers, Aboa Centre for Economics 51, Aboa Centre for Economics.
  7. Geoffroy Clippel, 2007. "An axiomatization of the Nash bargaining solution," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 201-210, September.
  8. Kıbrıs, Özgür & Tapkı, İpek Gürsel, 2011. "Bargaining with nonanonymous disagreement: Decomposable rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 151-161.
  9. Abraham Diskin & Dan S. Felsenthal, 2007. "Individual rationality and bargaining," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library 24233, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  10. Vartiainen, Hannu, 2007. "Collective choice with endogenous reference outcome," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 172-180, January.

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