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A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution

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Author Info
Nir Dagan
Oscar Volij
Eyal Winter

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Abstract

We characterize the Nash bargaining solution replacing the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives with three independent axioms: Independence of Non-Individually Rational Alternatives, Twisting and Disagreement Point Convexity. We give a non-cooperative bargaining interpretation to this last axiom.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Nir Dagan in its series Economic theory and game theory with number 018.

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Length: 12 pages
Date of creation: 31 Aug 2000
Date of revision: 21 Sep 2000
Publication status: Published in Social Choice and Welfare 19:811-823 (2002)
Handle: RePEc:nid:ndagan:018

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Nir Dagan, Dept. of Economics and Management, Tel-Hai Academic College, Upper Galilee, Israel.
Web page: http://www.nirdagan.com/research/

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Nir Dagan).

Related research
Keywords: bargaining problem; Nash solution; axiomatic characterization; Independence of Non-Individually Rational Alternatives; Twisting; Disagreement Point Convexity;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Peters, Hans J M, 1986. "Simultaneity of Issues and Additivity in Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(1), pages 153-69, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Mariotti, Marco, 1999. "Fair Bargains: Distributive Justice and Nash Bargaining Theory," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(3), pages 733-41, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Marco Mariotti, 2000. "Maximal symmetry and the Nash solution," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 45-53. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Ken Binmore & Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1986. "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 176-188, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Ehud Kalai & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1976. "Arbitration of Two-Party Disputes Under Ignorance," Discussion Papers 215, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  8. Kalai, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Meir, 1975. "Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 513-18, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Lensberg, Terje, 1988. "Stability and the Nash solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 330-341, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Thomson, William, 1994. "Cooperative models of bargaining," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 35, pages 1237-1284 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Chun, Youngsub & Thomson, William, 1990. "Nash solution and uncertain disagreement points," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 213-223, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Geoffroy de Clippel, 2004. "An Axiomatization of the Nash Bargaining Solution," Working Papers 2004-17, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Haruo Imai & Hannu Salonen, 2009. "Limit Solutions for Finite Horizon Bargaining Problems," Discussion Papers 51, Aboa Centre for Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij & Eyal Winter, 2001. "The time-preference Nash solution," Economic theory and game theory 019, Nir Dagan. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Frank A. Schmid, 2001. "Equity financing of the entrepreneurial firm," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Nov., pages 15-28. [Downloadable!]
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