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The Nash Bargaining Solution is Optimal

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Eric van Damme

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File URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/597.pdf
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Paper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 597.

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Date of creation: Apr 1984
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Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:597

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Myerson, Roger B, 1977. "Two-Person Bargaining Problems and Comparable Utility," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(7), pages 1631-37, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Robert W. Rosenthal, 1975. "An Arbitration Model for Normal-Form Games," Discussion Papers 121, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  4. de Koster, R. & Peters, H. J. M. & Tijs, S. H. & Wakker, P., 1983. "Risk sensitivity, independence of irrelevant alternatives and continuity of bargaining solutions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 295-300, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Roth, Alvin E & Rothblum, Uriel G, 1982. "Risk Aversion and Nash's Solution for Bargaining Games with Risky Outcomes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(3), pages 639-47, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Ehud Kalai, 1983. "Solutions to the Bargaining Problem," Discussion Papers 556, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  9. Kalai, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Meir, 1975. "Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 513-18, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Kalai, Ehud, 1977. "Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(7), pages 1623-30, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Kihlstrom, Richard E. & Mirman, Leonard J., 1974. "Risk aversion with many commodities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 361-388, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Herrero & C., 2004. "On the Adjudication of Conflicting Claims: An Experimental Study," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 166, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  2. Walter Trockel, 1999. "On the Nash Program for the Nash Bargaining Solution," UCLA Economics Working Papers 788, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Trockel,W., 2001. "Can and should the Nash program be looked at as a part of mechanism theory?," Working papers 322, University of Bielefeld, Insitute of Mathematical Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Walter Trockel, 1999. "Integrating the Nash Program into Mechanism Theory," UCLA Economics Working Papers 787, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Carmen Herrero, 2000. "The Three Musketeers. Old Solutions to Bankruptcy Problems," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0609, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
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