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Bargaining, Coalitions, and Competition

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Author Info
Nir Dagan (Department of Economics, Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
Roberto Serrano
Oscar Volij (Department of Economics, Brown University, and Department of Economics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem.)

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Abstract

We study a decentralized matching model in a large exchange economy, in which trade takes place through non-cooperative bargaining in coalitions of finite size. Under essentially the same conditions of core equivalence, we show that the strategic equilibrium outcomes of our model coincide with the Walrasian allocations of the economy. Our method of proof makes use of the theory of the core. With respect to previous work, our model relaxes differentiability and convexity of preferences, and also admits indivisible goods.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Oscar Volij in its series Economic theory and game theory with number 003.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: Jun 1996
Date of revision: Jul 1998
Publication status: Published in Economic Theory 15:279-296 (2000)
Handle: RePEc:nid:ovolij:003

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Postal: Oscar Volij, Department of Economics, Ben-Gurion University, Beer-Sheva 84105, Israel
Web page: http://volij.co.il/

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Related research
Keywords: Finite coalitions; strategic bargaining; core; Walrasian equilibrium;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
D41 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Perfect Competition
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Nir Dagan, 1994. "Recontracting and Competition," Economics Working Papers 152, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jan 1996. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Gale, Douglas M, 1986. "Bargaining and Competition Part I: Characterization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 785-806, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Gale, Douglas M, 1986. "Bargaining and Competition Part II: Existence," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 807-18, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Serrano Roberto, 1995. "A Market to Implement the Core," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 285-294, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 1997. "Non-cooperative implementation of the core," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 513-525. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Hart, Sergiu & Hildenbrand, Werner & Kohlberg, Elon, 1974. "On equilibrium allocations as distributions on the commodity space," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 159-166, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Perry, Motty & Reny, Philip J, 1994. "A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 795-817, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Rubinstein, Ariel & Wolinsky, Asher, 1985. "Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 1133-50, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Kannai, Yakar, 1970. "Continuity Properties of the Core of a Market," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 38(6), pages 791-815, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  12. Hammond, Peter J. & Kaneko, Mamoru & Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1989. "Continuum economies with finite coalitions: Core, equilibria, and widespread externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 113-134, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Alexander Kovalenkov & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 2000. "Approximate Cores of Games and Economies with Clubs," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1790, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Muhamet Yildiz, 2002. "Walrasian Bargaining," Theory workshop papers 505798000000000003, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 2003. "MISTAKE IN COOPERATION:the Stochastic Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting," Working Papers 2003-23, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2002. "Bargaining and Competition Revisited," Working Papers 2002-14, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Bargaining," Working Papers 2007-06, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales. [Downloadable!]
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