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Settlement negotiations with two-sided asymmetric information: Model duality, information distribution, and efficiency Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Daughety, Andrew F.
Reinganum, Jennifer F.
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal International Review of Law and Economics .
Volume (Year): 14 (1994)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 283-298
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Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:14:y:1994:i:3:p:283-298Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/irle
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Gale, Douglas M, 1986.
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Rubinstein, Ariel & Wolinsky, Asher, 1985.
"Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining ,"
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Perry, Motty, 1986.
"An Example of Price Formation in Bilateral Situations: A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information ,"
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Steven Shavell, 1981.
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Sobel, Joel & Takahashi, Ichiro, 1983.
"A Multistage Model of Bargaining ,"
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I.P.L. P'ng, 1983.
"Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement, and Trial ,"
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Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 1995.
"Keeping Society in the Dark: On the Admissibility of Pretrial Negotiations as Evidence in Court ,"
RAND Journal of Economics ,
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Other versions:
Daughety, A. & Reinganum, J., 1991.
"Keeping Society in the Dark : On the Admissibility of Pretrial Nogotiations as Evidence in Court ,"
Working Papers
91-24, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 1994.
"Keeping Society in the Dark: On the Admissibility of Pretrial Negotiations As Evidence in Court ,"
Game Theory and Information
9403008, EconWPA.
[Downloadable!] Daughety, Andrew & Reinganum, Jennifer, 1994.
"Keeping Society in the Dark: On the Admissibility of Pretrial Negotiations as Evidence in Court ,"
Working Papers
94-06, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
Jennifer F. Reinganum & Louise L. Wilde, 1986.
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Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Raymond J. Deneckere, 2002.
"Bargaining with Incomplete Information ,"
Papers of Peter Cramton
02barg, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 12 Mar 2001.
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Other versions:
Ausubel, Lawrence M. & Cramton, Peter & Deneckere, Raymond J., 2002.
"Bargaining with incomplete information ,"
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications ,
in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 50, pages 1897-1945
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[Downloadable!] (restricted) Gale, Douglas, 1987.
"Limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining ,"
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Samuelson, Larry, 1992.
"Disagreement in Markets with Matching and Bargaining ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
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Binmore, Ken G & Herrero, M J, 1988.
"Matching and Bargaining in Dynamic Markets ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
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Salant, Stephen W., 1984.
"Litigation of Settlement Demands Questioned by Bayesian Defendants ,"
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516, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
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Cramton, Peter C & Tracy, Joseph S, 1992.
"Strikes and Holdouts in Wage Bargaining: Theory and Data ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 100-121, March.
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Other versions: Binmore, Ken G & Herrero, M J, 1988.
"Security Equilibrium ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
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Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1983.
"Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 50(2), pages 221-47, April.
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Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Álvaro Bustos & Ronen Avraham., 2008.
"The Unexpected Effects of Caps on Non-Economic Damages ,"
Documentos de Trabajo
353, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
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Pao-Li Chang, 2002.
"The Evolution and Utilization of the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism ,"
Working Papers
475, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan.
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Bertrand Chopard & Thomas Cortade & Eric Langlais, 2008.
"Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties ,"
EconomiX Working Papers
2008-32, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Langlais, Eric, 2005.
"Indemnisation des préjudices et fréquence des procès en présence d'une asymétrie d'informaion sur l'aversion au risque des parties [Compensation of damages and frequency of trials with asymmet ,"
MPRA Paper
1150, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 Nov 2006.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Chris William Sanchirico, 2004.
"Games, Information, and Evidence Production: With Application to English Legal History ,"
Law and Economics
0403002, EconWPA.
[Downloadable!]
Langlais, Eric, 2008.
"Cognitive dissonance, risk aversion and the pretrial negotiation impasse ,"
MPRA Paper
8844, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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Philippe Choné & Laurent Linnemer, 2008.
"Optimal Litigation Strategies with Signaling and Screening ,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich.
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Other versions: Douglas Cumming, 2001.
"Settlement Disputes: Evidence from a Legal Practice Perspective ,"
European Journal of Law and Economics ,
Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 249-280, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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