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Keeping Society in the Dark: On the Admissibility of Pretrial Negotiations As Evidence in Court

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Author Info
Andrew F. Daughety (Economics)
Jennifer F. Reinganum (Univ. of Iowa)

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Abstract

We model the settlement and litigation process, allowing for incomplete information about the level of damages (incurred by the plaintiff) on the part of both the defendant and the court, and use the model to examine the effect of making (currently inadmissible) settlement demands admissible as evidence in court should a case proceed to trial. Two conclusions emerge. First, admissibility rules have efficiency consequences: making a pretrial demand admissible would increase the expected number of cases that go to trial. Second, such rules have distributional consequences and need not benefit all parties to a controversy. As an example, in product liability cases consumers are likely to favor inadmissibility, while corporations will favor the reverse.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 9403008.

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Length: 40 pages
Date of creation: 31 Mar 1994
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9403008

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Barry Nalebuff, 1987. "Credible Pretrial Negotiation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(2), pages 198-210, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Gertner, Robert H. & Gibbons, Robert. & Scharfstein, David., 1987. "Simultaneous signaling to the capital and product markets," Working papers 1917-87., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Farrell, Joseph & Gibbons, Robert, 1989. "Cheap Talk with Two Audiences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(5), pages 1214-23, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Rubinfeld, Daniel L., 1988. "The deterrent effects of settlements and trials," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 109-116, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Spier, Kathryn E, 1992. "The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(1), pages 93-108, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Landes, William M, 1971. "An Economic Analysis of the Courts," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(1), pages 61-107, April.
  7. Schweizer, Urs, 1989. "Litigation and Settlement under Two-Sided Incomplete Information," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 56(2), pages 163-77, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 1984. "Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(3), pages 404-415, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Daughety, Adnrew F & Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1993. "Endogenous Sequencing in Models of Settlement and Litigation," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(2), pages 314-48, October.
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  10. Steven Shavell, 1981. "Suit and Settlement vs. Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs," NBER Working Papers 0662, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. I.P.L. P'ng, 1983. "Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement, and Trial," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 539-550, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Steven Shavell, 1989. "Sharing of Information Prior to Settlement or Litigation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(2), pages 183-195, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Gerald D. Gay & Martin F. Grace & Jayant R. Kale & Thomas H. Noe, 1989. "Noisy Juries and the Choice of Trial Mode in a Sequential Signalling Game: Theory and Evidence," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(2), pages 196-213, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Jennifer F. Reinganum & Louise L. Wilde, 1986. "Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(4), pages 557-566, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Salant, Stephen W., 1984. "Litigation of Settlement Demands Questioned by Bayesian Defendants," Working Papers 516, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  16. Daniel L. Rubinfeld & David E.M. Sappington, 1987. "Efficient Awards and Standards of Proof in Judicial Proceedings," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(2), pages 308-315, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Dhammika Dharmapala & Thomas J. Miceli, 2003. "Search, Seizure and (False?) Arrest: An Analysis of Fourth Amendment Remedies when Police can Plant Evidence," Working papers 2003-37, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Neil Rickman & Dionisia Tzavara, 2005. "Optimal Pricing of Court Services," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 31-41, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. W. Bentley MacLeod, 2006. "Reputations, relationships and the enforcement of incomplete contracts," Discussion Papers 0506-23, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Eric Rasmusen, 1995. "``Predictable and Unpredictable Error in Tort Awards: The Effect of Plaintiff Self Selection and Signalling,''," Law and Economics 9506003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  5. Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 2007. "Rules of Proof, Courts, and Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 1994. "Settlement Negotiations with Two-Sided Asymmetric Information: Model Duality, Information Distribution and Efficiency," Game Theory and Information 9403009, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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