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Pretrial bargaining with self-serving bias and asymmetric information

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Author Info
Farmer, Amy
Pecorino, Paul

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Abstract

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

Volume (Year): 48 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 163-176
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:48:y:2002:i:2:p:163-176

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  1. Chopard, Bertrand & Cortade, Thomas & Langlais, Eric, 2008. "Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties," MPRA Paper 8995, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  2. Langlais, Eric, 2008. "Cognitive dissonance, risk aversion and the pretrial negotiation impasse," MPRA Paper 8844, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  3. Langlais, Eric, 2005. "Indemnisation des préjudices et fréquence des procès en présence d'une asymétrie d'informaion sur l'aversion au risque des parties
    [Compensation of damages and frequency of trials with asymmet    ," MPRA Paper 1150, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 Nov 2006. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2008-11-27.

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