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Abstract

We model privacy as an agent's choice of action being unobservable to others. An agent derives utility from his action, the aggregate of agents' actions, and other agents' perceptions of his type. If his action is unobservable, he takes his full-information optimal action and is pooled with other types, while if observable, then he distorts it to enhance others' perceptions of him. This increases the public good, but the disutility from distortion is a social cost. When the disutility of distortion is high (low) relative to the marginal utility of the public good, a policy of privacy (publicity) is optimal. (JEL D82, H41)

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File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mic.2.2.191
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File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/mic/app/2009-0041_app.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Journal: Microeconomics.

Volume (Year): 2 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 191-221

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Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:2:y:2010:i:2:p:191-221

Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.2.2.191
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Related research

Keywords:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

• D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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Cited by:

1. Bruno Deffains & Claude Fluet, 2009. "Legal Liability when Individuals Have Moral Concerns," Cahiers de recherche 0951, CIRPEE.

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