Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Privacy Concerns, Voluntary Disclosure of Information, and Unraveling: An Experiment

Contents:

Author Info

  • Volker Benndorf
  • Dorothea Kübler
  • Hans-Theo Normann

Abstract

We study the voluntary revelation of private, personal information in a labor-market experiment with a lemons structure where workers can reveal their productivity at a cost. While rational revelation improves a worker's payoff, it imposes a negative externality on others and may trigger further unraveling. Our data suggest that subjects reveal their productivity less frequently than predicted in equilibrium. A loaded frame emphasizing personal information about workers' health leads to even less revelation. We show that three canonical behavioral models all predict too little rather than too much revelation: level-k reasoning, quantal-response equilibrium,and to a lesser extent inequality aversion.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/papers/pdf/SFB649DP2013-040.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany in its series SFB 649 Discussion Papers with number SFB649DP2013-040.

as in new window
Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2013-040

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Spandauer Str. 1,10178 Berlin
Phone: +49-30-2093-5708
Fax: +49-30-2093-5617
Email:
Web page: http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: information revelation; privacy; lemons market; level-k reasoning; quantal response equilibrium; inequality aversion;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Blanco, Mariana & Engelmann, Dirk & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2010. "A within-subject analysis of other-regarding preferences," DICE Discussion Papers 06, Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
  2. Kawagoe, Toshiji & Takizawa, Hirokazu, 2012. "Level-k analysis of experimental centipede games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 548-566.
  3. Antoni Bosch-Dom?nech & Jose Garcia-Montalvo & Rosemarie Nagel & Albert Satorra, 2002. "One, two, (three), infinity: Newspaper and lab beauty-contest experiments," Artefactual Field Experiments 00011, The Field Experiments Website.
  4. Vincent P. Crawford & Nagore Iriberri, 2006. "Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000256, UCLA Department of Economics.
  5. David J. Cooper & Susan Garvin & John H. Kagel, 1997. "Signalling and Adaptive Learning in an Entry Limit Pricing Game," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(4), pages 662-683, Winter.
  6. Dorothea Kuebler, Wieland Mueller and Hans Normann, 2004. "Job market signaling and screening: An experimental comparison," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London 04/02, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Apr 2004.
  7. Philip A. Haile & Ali Hortacsu & Grigory Kosenok, 2003. "On the Empirical Content of Quantal Response Equilibrium," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000215, UCLA Department of Economics.
  8. Paul R. Milgrom, 1979. "Good Nevs and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 407R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  9. de Haan, Thomas & Offerman, Theo & Sloof, Randolph, 2011. "Noisy signaling: Theory and experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 402-428.
  10. Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A., 2004. "A model of noisy introspection," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 365-382, February.
  11. Simeon Schudy & Verena Utikal, 2012. "The Influence of (Im)perfect Data Privacy on the Acquisition of Personal Health Data," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2012-12, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
  12. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
  13. Lindner, Florian & Sutter, Matthias, 2013. "Level-k reasoning and time pressure in the 11-20 money request game," Munich Reprints in Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics 19234, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  14. Martin G. Kocher & Matthias Sutter, 2005. "The Decision Maker Matters: Individual Versus Group Behaviour in Experimental Beauty-Contest Games," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(500), pages 200-223, 01.
  15. Miller, Ross M & Plott, Charles R, 1985. "Product Quality Signaling in Experimental Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 837-72, July.
  16. Potters, Jan & van Winden, Frans, 1996. "Comparative Statics of a Signaling Game: An Experimental Study," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 329-53.
  17. Robert Forsythe & R. Mark Isaac & Thomas R. Palfrey, 1989. "Theories and Tests of "Blind Bidding" in Sealed-Bid Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(2), pages 214-238, Summer.
  18. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, . "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," IEW - Working Papers 004, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  19. Dale O. Stahl & Paul W. Wilson, 2010. "On Players' Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Levine's Working Paper Archive 542, David K. Levine.
  20. Ayala Arad & Ariel Rubinstein, 2012. "The 11-20 Money Request Game: A Level-k Reasoning Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 102(7), pages 3561-73, December.
  21. Brandts, Jordi & Holt, Charles A, 1992. "An Experimental Test of Equilibrium Dominance in Signaling Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1350-65, December.
  22. Nagel, Rosemarie, 1995. "Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1313-26, December.
  23. Boyan Jovanovic, 1982. "Truthful Disclosure of Information," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(1), pages 36-44, Spring.
  24. Alastair R. Beresford & Dorothea Kübler & Sören Preibusch, 2011. "Unwillingness to Pay for Privacy: A Field Experiment," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2011-010, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
  25. Colin F. Camerer & Teck-Hua Ho & Juin-Kuan Chong, 2004. "A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 119(3), pages 861-898, August.
  26. Ostrovsky, Michael & Schwarz, Michael, 2007. "Information Disclosure and Unraveling in Matching Markets," Research Papers 1965, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  27. Sanford Grossman & Oliver Hart, . "Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research 23-79, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
  28. David J. Cooper & John H. Kagel, 2009. "The Role of Context and Team Play in Cross-Game Learning," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 7(5), pages 1101-1139, 09.
  29. Teck-Hua Ho & Xuanming Su, 2013. "A Dynamic Level-k Model in Sequential Games," Management Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 59(2), pages 452-469, March.
  30. Gregory Lewis, 2011. "Asymmetric Information, Adverse Selection and Online Disclosure: The Case of eBay Motors," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 101(4), pages 1535-46, June.
  31. Grossman, Sanford J, 1981. "The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(3), pages 461-83, December.
  32. Martin, Stephen & Normann, Hans-Theo & Snyder, Christopher M, 2001. "Vertical Foreclosure in Experimental Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(3), pages 466-96, Autumn.
  33. Akerlof, George A, 1970. "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500, August.
  34. Ginger Zhe Jin, 2005. "Competition and Disclosure Incentives: An Empirical Study of HMOs," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(1), pages 93-112, Spring.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2013-040. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (RDC-Team).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.