Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Competition and Disclosure Incentives: An Empirical Study of HMOs

Contents:

Author Info

  • Ginger Zhe Jin

    ()
    (University of Maryland)

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    I examine health maintenance organizations' (HMOs) voluntary disclosure of product quality, which is not as complete as unravelling theories predict. After controlling for cost and demand factors, I find that HMOs use voluntary disclosure to differentiate from competitors, with lower disclosure rates in highly competitive markets. These findings are consistent with product differentiation, but they challenge the intuition that competition should lead to more provision of quality information.

    Download Info

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

    Volume (Year): 36 (2005)
    Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
    Pages: 93-112

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:36:y:2005:1:p:93-112

    Contact details of provider:
    Web page: http://www.rje.org

    Order Information:
    Web: https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/rje_online.cgi

    Related research

    Keywords: Analysis of Health Care Markets Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility Differentiation; HMO; Health; Product Differentiation; Product Quality; Quality;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    References

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Panos Markopoulos & Kartik Hosanagar, 2013. "A Model of Product Design and Information Disclosure Investments," Working Papers, NET Institute 13-25, NET Institute.
    2. Gregory Lewis, 2011. "Asymmetric Information, Adverse Selection and Online Disclosure: The Case of eBay Motors," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 101(4), pages 1535-46, June.
    3. Volker Benndorf & Dorothea Kübler & Hans-Theo Normann, 2013. "Privacy Concerns, Voluntary Disclosure of Information, and Unraveling: An Experiment," SFB 649 Discussion Papers, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany SFB649DP2013-040, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
    4. Michiel Bijlsma & Pierre Koning & Victoria Shestalova, 2013. "The Effect of Competition on Process and Outcome Quality of Hospital Care in the Netherlands," De Economist, Springer, Springer, vol. 161(2), pages 121-155, June.
    5. Arya, Anil & Mittendorf, Brian, 2007. "The interaction among disclosure, competition between firms, and analyst following," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 43(2-3), pages 321-339, July.
    6. Manuel Núñez-Nickel & Susana Gago Rodríguez, 2010. "Evolutionary model of existing competition and voluntary disclosure," Business Economics Working Papers, Universidad Carlos III, Instituto sobre Desarrollo Empresarial "Carmen Vidal Ballester" id-10-06, Universidad Carlos III, Instituto sobre Desarrollo Empresarial "Carmen Vidal Ballester".
    7. Alexander L. Brown & Colin F. Camerer & Dan Lovallo, 2012. "To Review or Not to Review? Limited Strategic Thinking at the Movie Box Office," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 4(2), pages 1-26, May.
    8. Xiao, Mo, 2010. "Is quality accreditation effective? Evidence from the childcare market," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 28(6), pages 708-721, November.
    9. Vincze, János, 2010. "Miért és mitől védjük a fogyasztókat?. Aszimmetrikus információ és/vagy korlátozott racionalitás
      [Asymmetric information and/or bounded rationality: why are consumers protected and from
      ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(9), pages 725-752.
    10. Ting Liu & Monic Jiayin Sun, 2007. "Informal Payments in Developing Countries' Public Health Sectors¤," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series, Boston University - Department of Economics WP2007-032, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    11. Jin, Ginger Zhe & Sorensen, Alan T., 2006. "Information and consumer choice: The value of publicized health plan ratings," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 248-275, March.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:36:y:2005:1:p:93-112. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.