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Competition and Disclosure Incentives: An Empirical Study of HMOs

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  • Ginger Zhe Jin

    (University of Maryland)

Abstract

I examine health maintenance organizations' (HMOs) voluntary disclosure of product quality, which is not as complete as unravelling theories predict. After controlling for cost and demand factors, I find that HMOs use voluntary disclosure to differentiate from competitors, with lower disclosure rates in highly competitive markets. These findings are consistent with product differentiation, but they challenge the intuition that competition should lead to more provision of quality information.

Suggested Citation

  • Ginger Zhe Jin, 2005. "Competition and Disclosure Incentives: An Empirical Study of HMOs," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(1), pages 93-112, Spring.
    • Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:36:y:2005:1:p:93-112
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Analysis of Health Care Markets Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility Differentiation; HMO; Health; Product Differentiation; Product Quality; Quality;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality

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