Level-k reasoning and time pressure in the 11–20 money request game
AbstractArad and Rubinstein (2012a) have designed a novel game to study level-k reasoning experimentally. Just like them, we find that the depth of reasoning is very limited and clearly different from that in equilibrium play. We show that such behavior is even robust to repetitions; hence there is, at best, little learning. However, under time pressure, behavior is, perhaps coincidentally, closer to that in equilibrium play. We argue that time pressure evokes intuitive reasoning and reduces the focal attraction of choosing higher (and per se more profitable) numbers in the game.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 120 (2013)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Level-k reasoning; Time pressure; Repetition; Experiment;
Other versions of this item:
- Florian Lindner & Matthias Sutter, 2013. "Level-k reasoning and time pressure in the 11-20 money request game," Working Papers 2013-13, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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