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Cognition And Behavior In Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study

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  • Miguel Costa-Gomes
  • Vincent P. Crawford

Abstract

This paper reports an experiment that elicits subjects? initial responses to 16 dominance-solvable two-person guessing games. The structure is publicly announced except for varying payoff parameters, to which subjects are given free access. Varying the parameters allows very strong separation of the behavior implied by leading decision rules. Subjects? decisions and searches show that most subjects understood the games and sought to maximize payoffs, but many had simplified models of others? decisions that led to systematic deviations from equilibrium. The predictable component of their deviations is well explained by a structural nonequilibrium model of initial responses based on level-k thinking. (JEL C72, C92, D83)

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 122247000000000143.

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Date of creation: 22 Apr 2004
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000143

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  1. Johnson, Eric J. & Camerer, Colin & Sen, Sankar & Rymon, Talia, 1998. "Detecting Failures of Backward Induction: Monitoring Information Search in Sequential Bargaining," Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences 1040, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  2. Dale O. Stahl & Paul W. Wilson, 2010. "On Players' Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Levine's Working Paper Archive 542, David K. Levine.
  3. Harless, David W. & Camerer, Colin F., 1995. "An error rate analysis of experimental data testing Nash refinements," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 649-660, April.
  4. Costa-Gomes, Miguel & Crawford, Vincent P & Broseta, Bruno, 2001. "Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 69(5), pages 1193-1235, September.
  5. Vincent P. Crawford & Nagore Iriberri, 2004. "Fatal Attraction: Focality, Naivete, and Sophistication in Experimental Hide-and-Seek Games," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000316, UCLA Department of Economics.
  6. Selten, Reinhard, . "Features of Experimentally Observed Bounded Rationality," Discussion Paper Serie B, University of Bonn, Germany 421, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Nov 1997.
  7. Colin F. Camerer & Teck-Hua Ho & Juin-Kuan Chong, 2004. "A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 119(3), pages 861-898, August.
  8. Jorgen W Weibull, 2004. "Testing Game Theory," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000181, UCLA Department of Economics.
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  11. Brit Grosskopf & Rosemarie Nagel, 2007. "Rational reasoning or adaptive behavior? Evidence from two-person beauty contest games," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra 1068, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
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  14. Crawford, Vincent P., 2001. "Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, UC San Diego qt6k65014s, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
  15. McKelvey Richard D. & Palfrey Thomas R., 1995. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 6-38, July.
  16. Stahl, Dale O., 1996. "Boundedly Rational Rule Learning in a Guessing Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 303-330, October.
  17. Johnson, Eric J. & Camerer, Colin & Sen, Sankar & Rymon, Talia, 2002. "Detecting Failures of Backward Induction: Monitoring Information Search in Sequential Bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 16-47, May.
  18. T. Randolph Beard & Richard O. Beil, 1994. "Do People Rely on the Self-Interested Maximization of Others? An Experimental Test," Management Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 40(2), pages 252-262, February.
  19. Dorothea Kübler & Georg Weizs�cker, 2004. "Limited Depth of Reasoning and Failure of Cascade Formation in the Laboratory," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(2), pages 425-441.
  20. Nagel, Rosemarie, 1995. "Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1313-26, December.
  21. Stahl, Dale II & Wilson, Paul W., 1994. "Experimental evidence on players' models of other players," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 309-327, December.
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