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Experimental Results on Interactive Competitive Guessing

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  • Nagel, Rosemarie

Abstract

A large number of players have to state simultaneously a number in the closed interval (0,100). The winner is the player whose stated number is closed to p-fold average of all chosen numbers, where p is a fixed and commonly known positive parameter. The game is repeated for several rounds. In the first round most of the stated numbers are far away from an equilibrium point. In the succeeding rounds, they approach an equilibrium or converge to it. We propose a simple theory of first round behavior that involves types of players who use finite steps of reasoning. As an explanation of behavior over time, a simple qualitative adaption process based on individual experience is suggested.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Discussion Paper Serie B with number 236.

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Length: pages
Date of creation: Apr 1993
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfb:236

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Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany
Fax: +49 228 73 6884
Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de

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Cited by:
  1. József Sákovics, 2001. "Games of Incomplete Information Without Common Knowledge Priors," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 50(4), pages 347-366, June.
  2. Vincent Crawford, 2003. "Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games," Theory workshop papers 505798000000000049, UCLA Department of Economics.
  3. Colin Camerer & Teck Ho & Kuan Chong, 2003. "Models of Thinking, Learning, and Teaching in Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(2), pages 192-195, May.
  4. Giovanna Devetag & Massimo Warglien, 2005. "Playing the wrong game: An experimental analysis of relational complexity and strategic misrepresentation," CEEL Working Papers 0504, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
  5. Reinhard Selten & Klaus Abbink & Joachim Buchta & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 2000. "How to Play 3x3-Games A Strategy Method Experiment," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse3_2001, University of Bonn, Germany.
  6. Miguel A. Costa-Gomes & Vincent P. Crawford, 2004. "Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study," ISER Discussion Paper 0613, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  7. Benito Arruñada & Veneta Andonova, 2004. "Judges' cognition and market order," Economics Working Papers 768, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jan 2008.
  8. Camerer, Colin F. & Ho, Teck-Hua & Chong, Juin-Kuan, 2002. "Sophisticated Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning and Strategic Teaching in Repeated Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 137-188, May.
  9. Roberto Weber, 2001. "Behavior and Learning in the “Dirty Faces†Game," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 229-242, December.

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