This file is part of IDEAS , which uses RePEc data
[ Papers |
Articles |
Software |
Books |
Chapters |
Authors |
Institutions |
JEL Classification |
NEP reports |
Search |
New papers by email |
Author registration |
Rankings |
Volunteers |
FAQ |
Blog |
Help! ]
Equilibrium PLay and Best Response to (Stated) Beliefs in Constant Sum Games Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Pedro Rey Biel (University College London)
Additional information is available for the following
registered author(s):
In a laboratory experiment, subjects played ten two-person 3x3 constant sum games and stated beliefs about the frequencies of play by their opponents. Contrary to previous experimental evidence, game-theoretical predictions work well: 80% of actions coincided with Nash equilibrium, subjects were good at predicting the action which was played with highest frequency and 73% of actions taken were best responses to stated beliefs. Complexity, measured by the necessary number of rounds of iterated deletion of dominated strategies to reach the equilibrium, did not affect behavior, although whether games were dominance solvable had an effect. We discuss possible reasons why results differ when the games and the experimental procedures are changed.
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page . Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Experimental with number
0506003.
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract ),
plain text
(with abstract ),
BibTeX ,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
Length: 50 pages
Date of creation: 08 Jun 2005Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0506003Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 50Contact details of provider: Web page: http://129.3.20.41
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (EconWPA).
Keywords: Experiments ; Constant Sum Games ; Belielfs ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports :
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Stahl, Dale II & Wilson, Paul W., 1994.
"Experimental evidence on players' models of other players ,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization ,
Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 309-327, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Kevin A. McCabe & Arijit Mukherji & David E. Runkle, 1994.
"An experimental study of learning and limited information in games ,"
Staff Report
176, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
[Downloadable!]
Camerer, Colin & Weigelt, Keith, 1988.
"Experimental Tests of a Sequential Equilibrium Reputation Model ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 56(1), pages 1-36, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Offerman, Theo & Sonnemans, Joep & Schram, Arthur, 1996.
"Value Orientations, Expectations and Voluntary Contributions in Public Goods ,"
Economic Journal ,
Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(437), pages 817-45, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Stahl Dale O. & Wilson Paul W., 1995.
"On Players' Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 218-254, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Costa-Gomes, Miguel & Crawford, Vincent P & Broseta, Bruno, 2001.
"Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 69(5), pages 1193-1235, September.
Other versions:
Miguel Costa-Gomes & Vincent Crawford & Bruno Broseta, 1998.
"Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study ,"
University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series
1998-22, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
[Downloadable!] Miguel Costa-Gomes & Vincent Crawford & Bruno Broseta, 1998.
"Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study ,"
University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series
98-22, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
[Downloadable!] Miguel Costa-Gomes & Vincent P. Crawford & Bruno Broseta, .
"Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games:An Experimental Study ,"
Discussion Papers
00/45, Department of Economics, University of York.
[Downloadable!] Miguel Costa-Gomes & Vincent P. Crawford & Bruno Broseta, 2000.
"Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study ,"
University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series
2000-02r, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
[Downloadable!] Huck, Steffen & Weizsacker, Georg, 2002.
"Do players correctly estimate what others do? : Evidence of conservatism in beliefs ,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization ,
Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 71-85, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Johnson, Eric J. & Camerer, Colin & Sen, Sankar & Rymon, Talia, 1998.
"Detecting Failures of Backward Induction: Monitoring Information Search in Sequential Bargaining ,"
Working Papers
1040, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
[Downloadable!]
Mookherjee Dilip & Sopher Barry, 1994.
"Learning Behavior in an Experimental Matching Pennies Game ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 62-91, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Binmore, Ken & Swierzbinski, Joe & Proulx, Chris, 2001.
"Does Minimax Work? An Experimental Study ,"
Economic Journal ,
Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(473), pages 445-64, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Reinhard Selten, 1998.
"Axiomatic Characterization of the Quadratic Scoring Rule ,"
Experimental Economics ,
Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 43-61, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Schotter Andrew & Weigelt Keith & Wilson Charles, 1994.
"A Laboratory Investigation of Multiperson Rationality and Presentation Effects ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 445-468, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Ochs, Jack & Roth, Alvin E, 1989.
"An Experimental Study of Sequential Bargaining ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 355-84, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A., 2004.
"A model of noisy introspection ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 365-382, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Cooper, Russell, et al, 1990.
"Selection Criteria in Coordination Games: Some Experimental Results ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 218-33, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ho, Teck-Hua & Camerer, Colin & Weigelt, Keith, 1998.
"Iterated Dominance and Iterated Best Response in Experimental "p-Beauty Contests." ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 947-69, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Mark Walker & John Wooders, 2001.
"Minimax Play at Wimbledon ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1521-1538, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Johnson, Eric J. & Camerer, Colin & Sen, Sankar & Rymon, Talia, 2002.
"Detecting Failures of Backward Induction: Monitoring Information Search in Sequential Bargaining ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 16-47, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Guth, Werner & Huck, Steffen & Muller, Wieland, 2001.
"The Relevance of Equal Splits in Ultimatum Games ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 161-169, October.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Yaw Nyarko & Andrew Schotter, 2002.
"An Experimental Study of Belief Learning Using Elicited Beliefs ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 70(3), pages 971-1005, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Charles A. Holt & Jacob K. Goeree, 1999.
"Stochastic Game Theory: For Playing Games, Not Just for Doing Theory ,"
Virginia Economics Online Papers
306, University of Virginia, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Fey, Mark & McKelvey, Richard D & Palfrey, Thomas R, 1996.
"An Experimental Study of Constant-Sum Centipede Games ,"
International Journal of Game Theory ,
Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 269-87.
Crawford, Vincent P., 2002.
"Introduction to Experimental Game Theory ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 1-15, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Weizsacker, Georg, 2003.
"Ignoring the rationality of others: evidence from experimental normal-form games ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 145-171, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Miguel A. Costa-Gomes & Georg Weizsäcker, 2004.
"Stated Beliefs and Play in Normal Form Games ,"
Levine's Bibliography
122247000000000236, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982.
"An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining ,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization ,
Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Nagel, Rosemarie, 1995.
"Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1313-26, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Barry Sopher & Dilip Mookherjee, 1997.
"Learning and Decision Costs in Experimental Constant Sum Games ,"
Departmental Working Papers
199527, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
Other versions:
Barry Sopher & Dilip Mookherjee, 2000.
"Learning and Decision Costs in Experimental Constant Sum Games ,"
Departmental Working Papers
199625, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
Mookherjee, Dilip & Sopher, Barry, 1997.
"Learning and Decision Costs in Experimental Constant Sum Games ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 97-132, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) McKelvey, Richard D & Page, Talbot, 1990.
"Public and Private Information: An Experimental Study of Information Pooling ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1321-39, November.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Cooper, David J. & Van Huyck, John B., 2003.
"Evidence on the equivalence of the strategic and extensive form representation of games ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 110(2), pages 290-308, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Fehr, Dietmar & Kübler, Dorothea & Danz, David N., 2008.
"Information and Beliefs in a Repeated Normal-Form Game ,"
IZA Discussion Papers
3627, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Gallice, Andrea, 2007.
"Best Responding to What? A Behavioral Approach to One Shot Play in 2x2 Games ,"
Discussion Papers in Economics
1365, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Access and
download statistics Did you know? A few items listed on IDEAS are over 2000 years old!
This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics , College of Liberal Arts and Sciences , University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics .