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Strategic Thinking

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  • Vincent P. Crawford
  • Miguel A. Costa-Gomes
  • Nagore Iriberri

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File URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4661465000000001148.pdf
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Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 661465000000001148.

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Date of creation: 31 Dec 2010
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:661465000000001148

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References

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  1. Ho, Teck-Hua & Camerer, Colin & Weigelt, Keith, 1998. "Iterated Dominance and Iterated Best Response in Experimental "p-Beauty Contests."," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 947-69, September.
  2. Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2000. "Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions," Virginia Economics Online Papers 345, University of Virginia, Department of Economics.
  3. Cai, Hongbin & Wang, Joseph Tao-Yi, 2006. "Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 7-36, July.
  4. Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2004. "Regular quantal response equilibrium," Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences 1203, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  5. Tore Ellingsen & Robert �stling, 2010. "When Does Communication Improve Coordination?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1695-1724, September.
  6. Ivana Komunjer & Federico Echenique, 2004. "Testing Models with Multiple Equilibria by Quantile Methods," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings, Econometric Society 447, Econometric Society.
  7. Breitmoser, Yves, 2010. "Hierarchical Reasoning versus Iterated Reasoning in p-Beauty Contest Guessing Games," MPRA Paper 19893, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Elie Tamer & Federico Ciliberto, 2004. "Market Structure and Multiple Equilibria in Airline Markets," 2004 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics 52, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  9. Joseph Tao-yi Wang & Michael Spezio & Colin F. Camerer, 2006. "Pinocchio's Pupil: Using Eyetracking and Pupil Dilation to Understand Truth-telling and Deception in Games," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000042, UCLA Department of Economics.
  10. Aradillas-Lopez, Andres & Tamer, Elie, 2008. "The Identification Power of Equilibrium in Simple Games," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, American Statistical Association, vol. 26, pages 261-310.
  11. Carlsson, Hans & van Damme, Eric, 1993. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 989-1018, September.
  12. Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt, 2000. "A Model of Noisy Introspection," Virginia Economics Online Papers 343, University of Virginia, Department of Economics.
  13. Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt, 2000. "Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory and Ten Intuitive Contradictions," Virginia Economics Online Papers 333, University of Virginia, Department of Economics.
  14. David M. Frankel & Stephen Morris & Ady Pauzner, 2001. "Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 1336, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  15. Yi, Kang-Oh, 2003. "A quantal response equilibrium model of order-statistic games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 413-425, July.
  16. Philip A. Haile & Ali Hortacsu & Grigory Kosenok, 0820. "On the Empirical Content of Quantal Response Equilibrium," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 1432R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jun 0820.
  17. Miguel A. Costa-Gomes & Georg Weizsäcker, 2004. "Stated Beliefs and Play in Normal Form Games," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000236, UCLA Department of Economics.
  18. David J. Cooper & John H. Kagel, 2005. "Are Two Heads Better Than One? Team versus Individual Play in Signaling Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 477-509, June.
  19. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
  20. Asen Ivanov & Dan Levin & Muriel Niederle, 2010. "Can Relaxation of Beliefs Rationalize the Winner's Curse?: An Experimental Study," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 78(4), pages 1435-1452, 07.
  21. Nicholas Bardsley & Judith Mehta & Chris Starmer & Robert Sugden, 2010. "Explaining Focal Points: Cognitive Hierarchy Theory "versus" Team Reasoning," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 120(543), pages 40-79, 03.
  22. Kenneth Clark & Stephen Kay & Martin Sefton, 1997. "When Are Nash Equilibria Self-Enforcing? An Experimental Analysis," Experimental, EconWPA 9707001, EconWPA.
  23. McKelvey, Richard D. & Palfrey, Thomas R. & Weber, Roberto A., 2000. "The effects of payoff magnitude and heterogeneity on behavior in 2 x 2 games with unique mixed strategy equilibria," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 42(4), pages 523-548, August.
  24. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2003. "Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 38-72, October.
  25. Anderson, Simon P. & Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A., 2001. "Minimum-Effort Coordination Games: Stochastic Potential and Logit Equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 177-199, February.
  26. Nagel, Rosemarie, 1995. "Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1313-26, December.
  27. Camerer, Colin F. & Palfrey, Thomas R. & Rogers, Brian W., 2006. "Heterogeneous quantal response equilibrium and cognitive hierarchies," Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences 1260, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  28. Van Huyck, John B. & Cook, Joseph P. & Battalio, Raymond C., 1997. "Adaptive behavior and coordination failure," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 483-503, April.
  29. Tomasz Strzalecki, . "Depth of Reasoning and Higher Order Beliefs," Working Paper 8334, Harvard University OpenScholar.
  30. Ganslandt, Mattias & Carlsson, Hans, 1997. "Noisy Equilibrium Selection in Coordination Games," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics 485, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  31. Colin F. Camerer & Teck-Hua Ho & Juin-Kuan Chong, 2004. "A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 119(3), pages 861-898, August.
  32. Kartik, Navin & Ottaviani, Marco & Squintani, Francesco, 2007. "Credulity, lies, and costly talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 93-116, May.
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