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Are Two Heads Better than One? Team versus Individual Play in Signaling Games

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Author Info
David J. Cooper
John H. Kagel

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Abstract

We compare individuals with two-person teams in signaling game experiments. Teams consistently play more strategically than individuals and generate positive synergies in more difficult games, beating a demanding "truth-wins" norm. The superior performance of teams is most striking following changes in payoffs that change the equilibrium outcome. Individuals play less strategically following the change in payoffs than inexperienced subjects playing the same game. In contrast, the teams exhibit positive learning transfer, playing more strategically following the change than inexperienced subjects. Dialogues between teammates are used to identify factors promoting strategic play.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 95 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Pages: 477-509
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Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:95:y:2005:i:3:p:477-509

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  8. Cason, Timothy N & Mui, Vai-Lam, 1997. "A Laboratory Study of Group Polarisation in the Team Dictator Game," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(444), pages 1465-83, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Stahl, Dale O., 1996. "Boundedly Rational Rule Learning in a Guessing Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 303-330, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Martin G. Kocher & Ganna Pogrebna & Matthias Sutter, . "The Determinants of Managerial Decisions Under Risk," Working Papers 2008-04, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck. [Downloadable!]
  2. Charness, Gary & Jackson, Matthew O., 2004. "Group Play in Games and the Role of Consent in Network Formation," Working Papers 1193, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Manfred Königstein & Gabriele K. Ruchala, 2007. "Performance Pay, Group Selection and Group Performance," IZA Discussion Papers 2697, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  4. Matthias Sutter, 2004. "Are four heads better than two? An experimental beauty-contest game with teams of different size," Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction 2004-15, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Antonio Cabrales & Gary Charness & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2006. "Competition, Hidden Information, and Efficiency: an Experiment," Working Papers 0605, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Matthew Ellman & Paul Pezanis-Christou, 2007. "Organisational structure, communication and group ethics," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 682.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
  7. Brady, Michael P. & Wu, Steven Y., 2008. "The Effect of Intragroup Communication on Preference Shifts in Groups," IZA Discussion Papers 3429, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  8. Jordi Brandts & David J. Cooper, 2006. "A Change Would Do You Good .... An Experimental Study on How to Overcome Coordination Failure in Organizations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 669-693, June.
  9. Jordi Brandts & David J. Cooper, 2005. "It's What You Say Not What You Pay," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 643.05, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
  10. David Masclet & Youenn Loheac & Laurent Denant-Boemont & Nathalie Colombier, 2004. "Group and individual risk preferences : a lottery-choice experiment," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques bla06063, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), revised Sep 2006. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Cason, Timothy N. & Mui, Vai-Lam, 2006. "Communication and Coordination in the Laboratory Collective Resistance Game," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1197, Purdue University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. David Cooper, 2006. "Are Experienced Managers Experts at Overcoming Coordination Failure?," Advances in Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 6(2), pages 1479-1479. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Wolfgang J. Luhan & Martin G. Kocher & Matthias Sutter, 2006. "Group Polarization in the Team Dictator Game reconsidered," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-099/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Kfir Eliaz & Debraj Ray & Ronny Razin, 2006. "Choice Shifts in Groups: A Decision-Theoretic Basis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1321-1332, September.
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