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Group polarization in the team dictator game reconsidered

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Author Info
Wolfgang Luhan ()
Martin Kocher ()
Matthias Sutter ()

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Abstract

While most papers on team decision-making find that teams behave more selfishly, less trustingly and less altruistically than individuals, Cason and Mui (1997) report that teams are more altruistic than individuals in a dictator game. Using a within-subjects design we re-examine group polarization by letting subjects make individual as well as team decisions in an experimental dictator game. In our experiment teams are more selfish than individuals, and the most selfish team member has the strongest influence on team decisions. Various explanations for the different findings in Cason and Mui (1997) and in our paper are discussed.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck in its series Working Papers with number 2007-12.

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Length: 30
Date of creation: Jul 2007
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Handle: RePEc:inn:wpaper:2007-12

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Related research
Keywords: Experiment dictator game team behavior social preferences

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Gary Bornstein & Matthias Sutter & Tamar Kugler & Martin G. Kocher, . "Trust between individuals and groups: Groups are less rusting than individuals but just as trustworthy," Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction 2005-02, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Martin G. Kocher & Matthias Sutter, 2004. "The Decision Maker Matters: Individual versus Group Behaviour in Experimental Beauty-Contest Games," Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction 2004-09, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Martin G. Kocher & Matthias Sutter, . "Individual versus group behavior and the role of the decision making procedure in gift-exchange experiments," Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-27, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Iris Bohnet & Bruno S. Frey, 1999. "Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 335-339, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Dufwenberg, Martin & Muren, Astri, 2006. "Gender composition in teams," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 50-54, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Cason, Timothy N & Mui, Vai-Lam, 1997. "A Laboratory Study of Group Polarisation in the Team Dictator Game," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(444), pages 1465-83, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Werner Güth & Carsten Schmidt & Matthias Sutter, 2005. "Bargaining Outside the Lab – A Newspaper Experiment of a Three-Person Ultimatum Game," Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-11, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Gary Bornstein & Tamar Kugler & Anthony Ziegelmeyer, 2002. "Individual and Group Decisions in the Centipede Game: Are Groups More “Rational” Players?," Discussion Paper Series dp298, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
  10. Bettina Kuon & Abdolkarim Sadrieh & Barbara Mathauschek, 1999. "Teams Take the Better Risks," Discussion Paper Serie B 452, University of Bonn, Germany.
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  11. Blinder, Alan S & Morgan, John, 2005. "Are Two Heads Better than One? Monetary Policy by Committee," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 37(5), pages 789-811, October.
  12. Kahneman, Daniel & Knetsch, Jack L & Thaler, Richard, 1986. "Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 728-41, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. David J. Cooper & John H. Kagel, 2005. "Are Two Heads Better than One? Team versus Individual Play in Signaling Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 477-509, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Gary Bornstein & Ilan Yaniv, 1998. "Individual and Group Behavior in the Ultimatum Game: Are Groups More “Rational†Players?," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 101-108, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Andreoni, James & Petrie, Ragan, 2004. "Public goods experiments without confidentiality: a glimpse into fund-raising," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(7-8), pages 1605-1623, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. James Cox & Stephen Hayne, 2006. "Barking up the right tree: Are small groups rational agents?," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 209-222, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Ronald Bosman & Frans van Winden, 2002. "Emotional Hazard in a Power-to-take Experiment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(476), pages 147-169, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Matthias Sutter & Martin Kocher & Sabine Strauß, . "Individuals and teams in UMTS-license auctions," Working Papers 2007-23, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck. [Downloadable!]
  2. Brady, Michael P. & Wu, Steven Y., 2008. "The Effect of Intragroup Communication on Preference Shifts in Groups," IZA Discussion Papers 3429, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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