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Trust between individuals and groups: Groups are less rusting than individuals but just as trustworthy

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Author Info
Gary Bornstein
Matthias Sutter ()
Tamar Kugler
Martin G. Kocher

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Abstract

We compared the behavior of groups and individuals in a two-person trust game. The first mover in this game, the sender, receives an endowment and can send any part of it to the responder; the amount sent is tripled, and the responder can then return to the sender any portion of the tripled sum. In a 2x2 design, the players in the roles of sender and responder were either individuals or groups of three players (who conducted face-to-face discussions to decide on a collective group strategy). We found that groups in the role of sender sent smaller amounts than individuals, and expected lower returns. In particular, groups sent nothing more often than individuals did (and were more likely to do so when the responder was another group). Groups and individuals in the role of responder returned on average the same fraction of the amount sent. Hence, we conclude that groups are less trusting than individuals, but just as trustworthy.

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Paper provided by Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group in its series Papers on Strategic Interaction with number 2005-02.

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Handle: RePEc:esi:discus:2005-02

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Related research
Keywords: decision making; trust game; group behavior;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter & Georg Kirchsteiger, 2001. "Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device," Levine's Working Paper Archive 563824000000000143, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  2. Chaim Fershtman & Uri Gneezy, 2001. "Discrimination In A Segmented Society: An Experimental Approach," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(1), pages 351-377, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Fehr, Ernst & Kirchsteiger, George & Riedl, Arno, 1993. "Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(2), pages 437-59, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Edward L. Glaeser & David I. Laibson & José A. Scheinkman & Christine L. Soutter, 2000. "Measuring Trust," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(3), pages 811-846, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Gary Bornstein & Ilan Yaniv, 1998. "Individual and Group Behavior in the Ultimatum Game: Are Groups More “Rational†Players?," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 101-108, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Alesina, Alberto & La Ferrara, Eliana, 2002. "Who trusts others?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 207-234, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, 1999. "Wage Rigidity in a Competitive Incomplete Contract Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(1), pages 106-134, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Cason, Timothy N & Mui, Vai-Lam, 1997. "A Laboratory Study of Group Polarisation in the Team Dictator Game," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(444), pages 1465-83, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. James C. Cox & Stephen C. Hayne, . "Barking Up the Right Tree: Are Small Groups Rational Agents?," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series 2006-02, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. [Downloadable!]
  10. Gary Bornstein & Tamar Kugler & Anthony Ziegelmeyer, 2002. "Individual and Group Decisions in the Centipede Game: Are Groups More “Rational” Players?," Discussion Paper Series dp298, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
  11. Berg Joyce & Dickhaut John & McCabe Kevin, 1995. "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 122-142, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Marcela Ibanez & Simon Czermak & Matthias Sutter, . "Searching for a better deal – On the influence of group decision making, time pressure and gender in a search experiment," Working Papers 2008-05, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Robert Jiro Netzer & Matthias Sutter, 2009. "Intercultural trust. An experiment in Austria and Japan," Working Papers 2009-05, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck. [Downloadable!]
  3. Kenju Akai & Robert J. Netzer, 2009. "Trust and Reciprocity among International Groups: Experimental Evidence from Austria and Japan," ISER Discussion Paper 0737, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University. [Downloadable!]
  4. Wolfgang J. Luhan & Martin G. Kocher & Matthias Sutter, 2006. "Group Polarization in the Team Dictator Game reconsidered," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-099/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Francesco Feri & Bernd Irlenbusch & Matthias Sutter, 2008. "Efficiency Gains from Team-Based Coordination – Large-Scale Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 2008-22, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Martin G. Kocher & Ganna Pogrebna & Matthias Sutter, . "The Determinants of Managerial Decisions Under Risk," Working Papers 2008-04, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck. [Downloadable!]
  7. Martin Kocher & Matthias Sutter, 2007. "Individual versus group behavior and the role of the decision making procedure in gift-exchange experiments," Empirica, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 63-88, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Brady, Michael P. & Wu, Steven Y., 2008. "The Effect of Intragroup Communication on Preference Shifts in Groups," IZA Discussion Papers 3429, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  9. Jingjing Zhang, 2009. "Communication in Asymmetric Group Competition over Public Goods," Department of Economics Working Papers 2009-06, McMaster University. [Downloadable!]
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