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The aggregation of preferences in groups: Identity, responsibility, and polarization

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Author Info

  • Brady, Michael P.
  • Wu, Steven Y.

Abstract

In this paper, we use laboratory experiments to investigate how group identity and team decision-making processes might impact economic decisions. Our primary aim is to move the literature closer to an integrated model of group decision making through the use of an experimental design that carefully examines group identity and team decision making in isolation and in combination. We find that both the direction and magnitude of the group deviation relative to individual decisions depends critically on group communication and decision-making structure. In total, results are best explained by the concept of responsibility-alleviation.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Psychology.

Volume (Year): 31 (2010)
Issue (Month): 6 (December)
Pages: 950-963

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Handle: RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:31:y:2010:i:6:p:950-963

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/joep

Related research

Keywords: Group behavior Teams Decision making Social preferences;

References

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  1. Luhan, W.J. & Kocher, Martin G. & Sutter, Matthias, 2009. "Group polarization in the team dictator game reconsidered," Munich Reprints in Economics 18216, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  2. George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, 2005. "Identity and the Economics of Organizations," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(1), pages 9-32, Winter.
  3. Lorenz Goette & David Huffman & Stephan Meier, 2006. "The Impact of Group Membership on Cooperation and Norm Enforcement: Evidence Using Random Assignment to Real Social Groups," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), pages 212-216, May.
  4. Gary Charness & Edi Karni & Dan Levin, 2007. "Individual and group decision making under risk: An experimental study of Bayesian updating and violations of first-order stochastic dominance," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 129-148, October.
  5. David J. Cooper & John H. Kagel, 2005. "Are Two Heads Better Than One? Team versus Individual Play in Signaling Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 477-509, June.
  6. Charness, Gary B, 1999. "Responsibility And Effort In An Experimental Labor Market," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt7x98w91h, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
  7. Charness, Gary B & Haruvy, Ernan, 1999. "Altruism, Equity, And Reciprocity In A Gift-Exchange Experiment: An Encompassing Approach," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt01n8x8m3, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
  8. Gary Bornstein & Matthias Sutter & Tamar Kugler & Martin G. Kocher, . "Trust between individuals and groups: Groups are less rusting than individuals but just as trustworthy," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2005-02, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  9. Matthias Sutter, 2008. "Individual behavior and group membership: Comment," Jena Economic Research Papers 2008-075, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
  10. Kfir Eliaz & Debraj Ray, 2004. "Choice Shifts in Groups," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 205, Econometric Society.
  11. Georg Kirchsteiger & Ernst Fehr & Arno Riedl, 1993. "Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/5927, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  12. Charness, Gary B & Jackson, Matthew O., 2007. "The Role of Responsibility in Strategic Risk-Taking," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt2mk4p42w, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
  13. Cason, Timothy N & Mui, Vai-Lam, 1997. "A Laboratory Study of Group Polarisation in the Team Dictator Game," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(444), pages 1465-83, September.
  14. Yan Chen & Sherry Xin Li, 2009. "Group Identity and Social Preferences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(1), pages 431-57, March.
  15. Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 2003. "Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests," General Economics and Teaching 0303002, EconWPA.
  16. Charness, Gary B, 2004. "Attribution And Reciprocity In An Experimental Labor Market," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt8rp6b18c, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
  17. Solow, John L. & Kirkwood, Nicole, 2002. "Group identity and gender in public goods experiments," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 403-412, August.
  18. Martin Kocher & Matthias Sutter, 2007. "Individual versus group behavior and the role of the decision making procedure in gift-exchange experiments," Empirica, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 63-88, March.
  19. Sutter, Matthias, 2005. "Are four heads better than two? An experimental beauty-contest game with teams of different size," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 41-46, July.
  20. George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, 2000. "Economics And Identity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(3), pages 715-753, August.
  21. Gary Bornstein & Ilan Yaniv, 1998. "Individual and Group Behavior in the Ultimatum Game: Are Groups More “Rational†Players?," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 101-108, June.
  22. Gary Charness & Luca Rigotti & Aldo Rustichini, 2007. "Individual Behavior and Group Membership," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(4), pages 1340-1352, September.
  23. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
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