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Efficiency Gains from Team-Based Coordination – Large-Scale Experimental Evidence

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Author Info
Francesco Feri ()
Bernd Irlenbusch ()
Matthias Sutter ()

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Abstract

The need for efficient coordination is ubiquitous in organizations and industries. The literature on the determinants of efficient coordination has focused on individual decision-making so far. In reality, however, teams often have to coordinate with other teams. We present an experiment with 825 participants, using six different coordination games, where either individuals or teams interact with each other. We find that teams coordinate much more efficiently than individuals. This finding adds one important cornerstone to the recent literature on the conditions for successful coordination. We explain the differences between individuals and teams using the experience weighted attraction learning model.

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Paper provided by Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck in its series Working Papers with number 2008-22.

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Length: 48
Date of creation: Sep 2008
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Handle: RePEc:inn:wpaper:2008-22

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Related research
Keywords: Coordination games; Individual decision-making; Team decision-making; Experience-weighted attraction learning; Experiment;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior

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