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The Effect of Intragroup Communication on Preference Shifts in Groups Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Brady, Michael P. () (U.S. Department of Agriculture)
Wu, Steven Y. () (Ohio State University)
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We use a laboratory gift-exchange game to examine decisions made by groups under three different procedures that dictate how group members interact and reach decisions in comparison to individuals acting alone. We find that group decisions do deviate from those of individuals, but the direction and magnitude of gift exchange depend critically on the procedure. This suggests that no general statements can be made concerning the propensity of groups to exhibit reciprocal or other-regarding behavior relative to individuals. The rules governing how group members can express their preferences and expectations to other group members are critical for determining group outcomes.
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Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number
3429.
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Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2008Date of revision:
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Keywords: group behavior teams decision making social preferences Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Dirk Engelmann & Martin Strobel, 2004.
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