This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Optimization Incentives and Coordination Failure in Laboratory Stag Hunt Games

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Battalio, Raymond
Samuelson, Larry
Van Huyck, John
Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 69 (2001)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
Pages: 749-64
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:69:y:2001:i:3:p:749-64

Contact details of provider:
Phone: 1 212 998 3820
Fax: 1 212 995 4487
Email:
Web page: http://www.econometricsociety.org/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:
Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/memb.asp?ref=0012-9682

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Jim Engle-Warnick & Ed Hopkins, 2006. "A Simple Test of Learning Theory?," ESE Discussion Papers 153, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Albert Banal-Estañol & Jo Seldeslachts, 2005. "Merger Failures," CIG Working Papers SP II 2005-09, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG). [Downloadable!]
  3. David J. Cooper & John H. Kagel, 2005. "Are Two Heads Better than One? Team versus Individual Play in Signaling Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 477-509, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Jordi Brandts & David J. Cooper, 2006. "A Change Would Do You Good .... An Experimental Study on How to Overcome Coordination Failure in Organizations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 669-693, June.
  5. Maria Giovanna Devetag, 2002. "Coordination and information in critical mass games: an experimental study," CEEL Working Papers 0214, Computable and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Jordi Brandts & David J. Cooper, 2005. "It's What You Say Not What You Pay," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 643.05, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
  7. Giovanna Devetag, 2000. "Coordination in "Critical Mass" Games: An Experimental Study," LEM Papers Series 2000/03, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy. [Downloadable!]
  8. Cason, Timothy N. & Mui, Vai-Lam, 2006. "Communication and Coordination in the Laboratory Collective Resistance Game," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1197, Purdue University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. John Duffy, 2004. "Agent-Based Models and Human Subject Experiments," Computational Economics 0412001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Il-Horn Hann & Kai-Lung Hui & Sang-Yong Tom Lee & Ivan P.L. Png, 2005. "Sales and Promotions: A More General Model," Industrial Organization 0508014, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  11. Nathaniel T Wilcox, 2003. "Heterogeneity and Learning Principles," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000435, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  12. Michel Benaim & Josef Hofbauer & Ed Hopkins, 2005. "Learning in Games with Unstable Equilibria," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000609, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Larry Samuelson, 2002. "Evolution and Game Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 47-66, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Antoine Terracol & Jonathan Vaksmann, 2007. "Dumbing down rational players : Learning and teaching in an experimental game," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne bla07017, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne. [Downloadable!]
  15. David J Cooper & John B Van Huyck, 2002. "Evidence on the Equivalence of the Stratetic and Extensive Form Representation of Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 234936000000000001, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  16. repec:att:wimass:1920220 is not listed on IDEAS
  17. Vyrastekova, J., 2002. "Efficiency versus risk dominance in an evolutionary model with cheap talk," Discussion Paper 6, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? The yearly budget of IDEAS is exactly $0: it relies entirely on volunteer work.

This page was last updated on 2008-8-11.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.