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Adaptive Learning vs. Equilibrium Refinements in an Entry Limit Pricing Game

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Author Info
Cooper, David J
Garvin, Susan
Kagel, John H

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Abstract

Signaling models are studied using experiments and adaptive learning models in an entry limit pricing game. Even though high cost monopolies never play dominated strategies, the easier it is for other players to recognize that these strategies are dominated, the more likely play is to converge to the undominated separating equilibrium and the more rapidly limit pricing develops. This is inconsistent with the equilibrium refinements literature, including I. Cho and D. Kreps's (1987) intuitive criterion, and pure (Bayesian) adaptive learning models. An augmented adaptive learning model in which some players recognize the existence of dominated strategies and their consequences predicts these outcomes. Copyright 1997 by Royal Economic Society.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Royal Economic Society in its journal The Economic Journal.

Volume (Year): 107 (1997)
Issue (Month): 442 (May)
Pages: 553-75
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Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:107:y:1997:i:442:p:553-75

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  1. Potters, J & Winden, F. van, 1995. "Comparitive statics of a signaling game : an experimental study," Discussion Paper 126, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Colin Camerer & Teck H Ho & Juin-Kuan Chong & Keith Weigelt, 2003. "Strategic teaching and equilibrium models of repeated trust and entry games," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000506, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. C. Monica Capra & Jacob K. Goeree & Rosario Gomez & Charles A. Holt, 2000. "Learning and Noisy Equilibrium Behavior in an Experimental Study of Imperfect Price Competition," Virginia Economics Online Papers 336, University of Virginia, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Potters, J.J.M. & Shefton, M. & Vesterlund, L., 2003. "After you - endougenous sequencing in voluntary contribution games," Discussion Paper 98, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. David J. Cooper & John H. Kagel & Wei Lo, 1999. "Gaming Against Managers in Incentive Systems: Experimental Results with Chinese Students and Chinese Managers," Artefactual Field Experiments 0034, The Field Experiments Website. [Downloadable!]
  6. Dorothea Kuebler, Wieland Mueller and Hans Normann, 2004. "Job market signaling and screening: An experimental comparison," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 04/02, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Apr 2004. [Downloadable!]
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  7. David J. Cooper & John H. Kagel, 2005. "Are Two Heads Better Than One? Team versus Individual Play in Signaling Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 477-509, June. [Downloadable!]
  8. Anderson, Christopher M. & Camerer, Colin F., 1999. "Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning in Sender-Receiver Signaling Games," Working Papers 1058, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  9. David J. Cooper et al., 1999. "Gaming against Managers in Incentive Systems: Experimental Results with Chinese Students and Chinese Managers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 781-804, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. David Cooper & Nick Feltovich & Alvin Roth & Rami Zwick, 2003. "Relative versus Absolute Speed of Adjustment in Strategic Environments: Responder Behavior in Ultimatum Games," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 181-207, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Ed Hopkins, 2004. "Adaptive Learning Models of Consumer Behaviour," ESE Discussion Papers 121, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Ed Hopkins, 2004. "Adaptative Learning Models of Consumer Behaviour (first version)," ESE Discussion Papers 80, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  13. Potters, J. & Sefton, M. & Vesterlund, L., 2001. "Why announce leadership contributions? : An experimental study of the signaling and reciprocity hypotheses," Discussion Paper 100, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  14. Aditya Bhattacharjea, 2002. "Infant Industry Protection Revisited: Entry Deterrence And Entry Promotion When A Foreign Monopolist Has Unknown Costs," International Economic Journal, Korean International Economic Association, vol. 16(3), pages 115-133, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. José Luis Lima R. & Javier Nuñez E., 2004. "Experimental Analysis of the Reputational Incentives in a Self Regulated Organization," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 194, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
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